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ABSTRACT 
INTUITIVE AND RATIONAL COGNITIVE STYLES IN THE PERSONNELS SELEC-
TION 
Personnel selection has been criticised by scientific researchers for its intuitive inter-
personal perception (e.g. Guion, 1998, Obermann, 2002 etc.). Despite extensive scientific 
research in organizational setting (Mell, 1988; Schuler, 2001 etc.), Human Resource practitio-
ners attribute their successful decisions to intuition (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002). In the Studies 1 
to 4, personnel decisions made by the participants with different cognitive styles were tested. 
Participants were asked to select the best candidate based on his resume and recommendations 
(Study 1). The candidates had to be evaluated after the structured interview (Study 2) or after 
the group discussion during the Assessment Center (Study 4). Participants also had the possi-
bility to decide using the scores of the candidates achieved during the Assessment Center 
(Study 3). The results of the first four studies revealed that the intuitive cognitive style was 
very successful in situations when working with information (e.g. scores, resumes). This find-
ing supports opinions of the organizational practitioners (Agor, 1989 etc.). At the same time, 
intuitive interpersonal judgment (e.g. observation) was significantly worse than rational. This 
finding supports the recommendations of organizational psychologists to use standardized 
methods (e.g. personality tests and structured interviews). One explanation of these findings is 
that intuitive participants have a higher confirmation-bias than rational participants, which 
was found to influence negatively successful decision making (e.g. Kray & Galinski, 2003). 
Intuitive participants showed higher confirmation bias than rational participants, especially in 
the step-by-step procedure. Rational participants were interested in the controversial informa-
tion, but not when asked to decide spontaneously. 
Alternative explanation of these considers the learning style preferences of the intui-
tive and rational participants. Rational participants tend to use Realistic Observation, which 
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might explain their good observer qualities. Intuitive participants tend to use Active Experi-
mentation and might handle data with ease, in comparison to the rational participants.  
Studies 3 and 4 continued investigation on the intuitive and rational decision making in dif-
ferent stages of the personnel selection. Intuitive decision makers were found to be better 
when handling with big amounts of partially missing, irrelevant information or handling 
scores of the standardized procedures. They also had higher preferences for cognitive bias and 
selecting the recommendations supporting their opinion then opposite to it. This could be ex-
plained by their learning style preferences – active and pragmatic. Looking for new things and 
implementing findings. Rational decision makers were more theoretical and looking for con-
troversial information, except for the situations when under stress or forced to make a deci-
sion. In this case, similar to the intuitive participants, they also tend to search for consistent 
information. 
In the Study 5, we have measured the performance evaluation of groups with rational 
and intuitive cognitive styles, as well as heterogeneous groups. The findings supported the 
results of the previous studies (e.g. Armstrong & Priola, 2001) that intuitive groups are more 
successful when working in the natural conditions. Intuitive members come along with each 
other and don’t report difficulties even when working in the virtual environment. Heterogene-
ous groups reported no difficulties in the mutual work or communication with each other.  
 In sum, we have studied the influence of the intuitive and rational style on the person-
nel decisions made when using different personnel selection methods (application screening, 
employment interview, Assessment Center, recommendations). We have also studied the mu-
tual work of the participants with different cognitive styles.  
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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW 
Intuition has been a subject of investigation for centuries. Substantial amount of phi-
losophical literature and some recent studies in the experiential and cognitive psychology are 
dealing with the concept of intuition (Osbeck, 1999). The current interest in intuition is prac-
tical, coming from the organizational practitioners and receiving more and more response 
from the scientists. The philosophical tradition of intuition is more consistent in the concept 
definition of intuitive thinking than psychology. The definition of intuition is similar to “see-
ing” and understanding, the “immediate proposition”, as “one to which there is no other prior” 
(Aristotle, Post. Anal. 72a 7-9, cited by Osbeck, 1999). Intuition was studied by rationalists 
(Plato, Aristotle, Descartes), who understood intuition as a basis for reasoning processes and 
not contrasted to it. In medieval times (e.g. Ockham, Sentences), intuition was viewed as 
“…an apprehension of a thing, its qualities, and its relations to other things through an intel-
lectual event that is concurrent with sensation and gives rise to contingently true propositions 
concerning the objects sensed” (cited by Osbeck, 1999, p. 235). Modern philosophers appre-
hend intuitions as  “…elements or constituents of our knowledge and the knowledge of which 
they are elements is propositional knowledge” (Smyth, 1978). The epistemological concept of 
intuition includes such traits as “immediate apprehension, where immediate is understood in 
terms of absence: of inference, justification, mediation, or grounds” (Osbeck, 1999, p. 234), 
being a part of rational activity, on preconscious and conscious levels. Despite the older com-
prehension of intuition as opposite to the rational approach, the philosophical view of intui-
tion is similar to the psychological understanding of intuition as a cognitive function. Despite 
the quite short history of intuition in psychology compared to philosophical traditions, psy-
chological notions are much more varied than philosophical concepts. This Chapter provides a 
brief overview of different concepts of intuition in psychology and describes the chosen con-
cept for the empirical investigation. 
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Intuition in Psychology 
Cognitive and experiential psychology has avoided the notion of intuition as a topic of 
inquiry for quite a long time (e.g. Claxton, 1998). In recent years, some research was occurred 
in this area, but the absence of a unique concept (Osbeck, 1999) makes the research in this 
field quite complicated. Moreover, few instruments have been developed to measure intuitive 
thought. It seems to be easier to define what is not intuition than what is intuition. Figure 1 
presents the conceptual differentiation between intuition and other concepts. 
Figure 1. Conceptual differentiation of intuition 
Intuition versus 
Rationality 
Insight 
Creativity 
Instinct 
Tacit knowledge
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1. Intuition ≠ Rationality. Unlike the fundamental philosophical understanding of the 
intuitive thought as a basic for rationality, psychologists strictly differentiate these notions. 
Bruner (1960) contradicts the intuitive process to the rational one, as long as: “… analytic 
thinking characteristically proceeds a step at a time. Steps are explicit and usually can be ade-
quately reported by the thinker to another individual” (p. 57). This makes it unlikely, that an 
intuitive thinker finds a correct solution unconsciously and has difficulties for explaining how 
the answer was fount. Erroneous reasoning process cannot be intuitive as long as intuition is a 
complex interaction of thinking processes, implying that there is some pattern, structure, or 
organization that exists prior to its detection (Bowers et al, 1995). Fischbein (1975) finds in-
tuition being intrinsic to reasoning, happening in the moment of transition from the first cog-
nitive step of “I know what I am looking for”, and the second cognitive stage of “I know what 
to do”. Quite a few researchers consider intuition to include reasoning (Baylor, 1997; Kuhl, 
1983). Others, like Hammond write about a “rivalry” between intuition and analysis “for the 
right to claim the virtue of superior cognitive performance” (1996, p. 92). Hammond also 
mentions that the future of intuition in psychology may be quite positive due to its importance 
for creative and speculative tasks, as well as negative due to its potential for error. These find-
ings made important practical implications, as long as unaided human judgment was deter-
mined, in some cases, to be inferior to statistically derived decisions (Grove & Meehl, 1996; 
Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
2. Intuition ≠ Insight. Lieberman (2000) mentions the necessity of a clear distinction 
between intuition and insight. When people speak of their intuition, quite often they mean 
insight. Psychologists are also likely to compare intuitive apprehension and insight, as long as 
insight  also fails to follow this step-by-step rational process. Immediacy of insight and its 
unconscious nature makes it very similar to intuition. Shooler & Melcher (1994) differentiate 
between intuition and insight: “… awareness derived in insight, it is not a judgment, as is usu-
ally the case in intuition. Rather, insight is a process where one suddenly becomes aware of 
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the logical relations between a problem and answer” (p. 110). Definitions of intuition stress-
ing the similarity with insight processes are, for example from Bouthilet (1948; cited by Os-
beck, 1999), when intuition is understood as “the capacity to make correct guesses without 
knowing why” (p. 47). Bowers, Farvolden & Mermigis (1995) also consider the cognitive 
processes in insight as being more continuous than the appearance of sudden insight implies. 
Khatri and Ng (2000) define intuition as the "smooth automatic performance of learned be-
havior sequences and often can short-circuit a step-wise decision-making, thus allowing an 
individual to know almost instantly what the best course of action is" (pp. 60–61). In the con-
ceptual intuition scheme made by Baylor (1997), insight is presented as a component of intui-
tion, where intuition is mediated by reason. These contradictions of insight and intuition have 
a more theoretical than  practical relevance,  two aspects could be investigated (e.g. behav-
ioral and level of expertise). 
3. Intuition ≠ Creativity. Although both intuition and creativity seem to create some-
thing from nothing, creativity cannot be compared neither to instinct nor to reasoning. Highly 
intuitive people could speak to their intuition inducing an altered state of consciousness (e.g., 
meditative) (Sowerby, 2001). Intuitive state is thought to give rise to creativity (Jung, 1923). 
This study we does not include creativity as a research topic, but considers it important to 
differentiate the conceptual notions. 
4. Intuition ≠ Instinct. The fundamental understanding of intuition as a trait (Jung, 
1923), considers that our intuition is inherited, with some people being more intuitive, some 
people less, and some possessing extraordinary intuitive abilities. Instinct is more an action 
than a thought, even considering the affective component. Some authors consider intuitions as 
behaviorally oriented, depending on previous experience, and tending to fulfil, correctly or 
incorrectly, some adaptive requirements (Fischbein, 1987), which also makes it look like in-
stinct. At the same time, others consider it to have a more integrative function, synthesizing 
knowledge, intelligence and experience (e.g. Glaser, 1995). 
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5. Intuition ≠ Implicit Learning. A substantial amount of research considers intuition 
similar to implicit learning. “Implicit learning” is learning from experience without awareness 
of doing so (Reber, 1967). Similarity of intuition to implicit learning (e.g. Reber, 1989; Lie-
berman, 2000) is consistent with the fundamental philosophical visions on intuition. In this 
approach, intuition is understood as “an unconscious process” (Reber, 1989, p. 219)… “a 
cognitive state that emerges under specifiable conditions”, enabling one “to engage in particu-
lar classes of action” (p. 233). This approach has been supported by the neuropsychological 
findings. The findings consider “basal ganglia” being of central importance for  both intuition 
and implicit learning, where “…basal ganglia are centrally involved in nonconscious predic-
tive sequencing in both the motor and cognitive domains” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 120).” Al-
though these studies failed to equate implicit learning and intuition, it was demonstrated that 
“…both social intuition and implicit learning rely on the integrity of the basal ganglia…”, it is 
concluded that social intuition operates by way of implicit learning. (p. 127).   
Many authors base their definitions on this approach of equality between the intuition 
and implicit learning (e.g. McDougall, 1923; Bowers et al., 1990). Baylor (1997) considers 
sensing relationship as a very important but still just a part of intuition, together with immedi-
acy and reasoning. The component of sensing relationships reflects the formulation of connec-
tions, based upon a person’s knowledge structures and reflecting level of expertise of the per-
son. Baylor (2001) differentiates between mature and immature intuition, where mature intui-
tion is the “intuitive seeing” using existing knowledge structures, and immature intuition 
might serve as a precursor for analytical understanding. 
Many different properties are ascribed to intuition, for example, sudden appearance, 
emotional involvement, preconscious process, contrast with logical thought, understanding by 
feeling, associations with creativity, instinctive knowledge and a subjective certainty of cor-
rectness (Bastick, 1982). Different types of intuition are also described, for instance, discov-
ery, creative, evaluation, operative, prediction, and illumination (e.g. Goldberg, 1989).
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Intuition as a Trait 
Personal differences in intuitiveness mentioned by McDougall, were developed by 
Jung (1923). Jung divided people into 4 types: Thinking, Feeling, Sensation, and Intuition. 
Intuition considers experience which is immediately given to consciousness rather than aris-
ing through mental activity (e.g. thinking or feeling), but without physical cause.  It is the 
source of inspiration,  creativity, novel ideas, etc. According to Jung,  the Intuitive type jumps 
from an image, shows interest for some brief period, but soon loses interest. Jung’s theory has 
served as a basis to a variety of different scales actively used for counselling purposes (e.g. 
Myers-Briggs-Type Indicator; MBTI). Human Resource practitioners have been found to be 
very intuitive (Agor, 1991). The goal of this study is to compare effectiveness of different 
decision making processes in personnel selection, and this study regards intuition as a process 
and not as a personality trait.  
Intuition as a Cognitive Process 
The model of cognition applied by this study differentiates between the intuitive and 
rational cognitive styles, where “one identified by terms such as rational, analytical, delibera-
tive, propositional, and extensional and other by terms such as experiential, automatic, intui-
tive, narrative, and natural” (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, p. 819), is Cognitive Estimate Self 
Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994). The working definition of intuition is “a preconscious system 
that automatically assimilates reality and directs behavior” (Epstein et al., 1996). The main 
assumption in CEST is that behavior is a joint function of both modes of processing, inde-
pendently and in an interactive manner. Thinking styles are found to  interact in such domains 
as coping (Epstein et al., 1996), irrational thinking (Wolfradt et al., 1999), and framing ef-
fects, and do not interact with regard to heuristic responses. Intuition is considered to be in the 
right hemisphere.  Epstein (1994) has proposed that our experiential self, opposite to a ra-
tional one, comes in force under stress, when people are being influenced by their previous 
experiences. Rational people tend to have a self-picture of being emotionally well-adjusted, 
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having self-control and responsible, while experiential (intuitive) people are likely to describe 
themselves as good communicator, tolerant, trusting, spontaneous, and open-minded (Pacini 
& Epstein, 1999).  
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) was developed by the authors of the CEST to 
quantify individual preference for intuition, and rationality. It consists of two scales, like Faith 
in Intuition (FI) and Need for Cognition (NC) and is known to have high test-retest reliability 
(Keller et al., 2000). In this study, REI is used to measure cognitive styles. 
Other instruments measuring intuition are known as well, for example Miller Intui-
tiveness Instrument (MII; Miller, 1995)  designed to measure the self-perception of intuitive-
ness (SPI) of practising nurses. Another instrument, Riding ’s Cognitive Styles Analysis 
(CSA) has also two scales: wholist-analytic and verbaliser-imager was found to have quite 
low reliability (Rezaei & Katz, 2004). Tests measuring intuition as a trait such as, Myers-
Briggs-Type Indicator (MBTI), to measure intuition are extremely popular.  
Effectiveness of the Intuitive and Rational Cognitive Styles 
It is not surprising that such differentiated understanding of intuition, brings different 
findings regarding the decision effectiveness. For example, Hammond et al. found support for 
the superiority of intuitive functioning in some areas (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 
1987). Accuracy was related to the degree of correspondence between the type of task and the 
type of the cognitive activity. Some authors consider performance to be better when cognitive 
properties correspond to task properties (Friedman et al., 1995). In some studies, rationality 
was found to be much better than intuition (Shiloh & Stenhav, 2004; Priola et al., 2004). In  
others, intuitives performed better (Noddings & Shore, 1984; Armstrong & Priola, 2001). For 
example, intuitive thinkers made unusual decisions and used creative methods (Agor, 1989). 
Both intuitive and analytic processes do have different kinds of errors producing unreliability, 
whereby analytical cognition is more likely than intuitive cognition to produce extreme errors.  
(Hammond, et al., 1987). A combination of intuitive and analytical modes (Hatsopoulos & 
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Hatsopoulos, 1999; Nutt, 1989; Yaniv & Hogarth, 1993) has been recommended as well. Me-
chanical prediction outperformed human intuition when based on the same information, but a 
combined approach was best when judges had access to relevant information not captured by 
the model (information asymmetry) (Whitecotton & Sanders, 1998). 
Decision makers have been found to perform poorly when multiple sources of infor-
mation were supposed to be combine into a global judgment. Intuitive decision making is pre-
ferred when making private consumer decisions, and less for expert jugdments (see Sjörberg, 
2003). Experts and managers also tend to use intuitive decision strategies almost exclusively 
under high stress conditions (Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, & Wolf, 1996). In sum, decision ana-
lysts prefer analytical approaches to decision making, while practitioners in many fields per-
sist in the belief that intuitive decisions are superior (e.g. Kuo, 1998). 
The current program of this research examines the effectiveness of  intuitive and ra-
tional decision making in different stages of personnel selection. It is hypothesized that the 
combination of both styles can bring improvement to the decision making effectiveness. 
Intuitive Decision in the Personnel Selection 
Global, widespread, and diverse forces impact today's economies and marketplaces, 
with important implications for personnel selection (Dunnette, 1997, Howard et al., 1996; 
Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999; Kraut & Korman ,1999; Pearlman & Barney, 1999, Schmitt & Chan, 
1998). Job performance constitutes all measurable work behaviors relevant to organizational 
goals and within the individual's control (Campbell et al, 1996). Despite the strategic impor-
tance of the correct placement for the future success of organizations, there seems to be a 
growing distance between the scientific findings and the practical implementations of these 
findings (Dunnette, 1990). 
Scientists stress the importance of using cognitive tests and structured interviews for 
the purposes of personnel decision making, as well as personality tests, due to their high va-
lidity and objectivity (e.g. Hunter, 1986; Barrick & Mount, 1991). The opinion of the practi-
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tioners differs from the scientific approach. For example, Liebling (1956) considers tests and 
questionnaires used for diagnostics superficial and considers intuition to be important to un-
derstand another person. This opinion is still supported by quite a few managers attributing 
their hiring successes primarily to luck and intuition (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002) and suggests 
using the least valid selection tools available to them (Cropanzano et al., 1993). The negative 
attitude toward standardized methods is increased by the organisational pressure (Klehe, 
2004). Furthermore, when using standardized procedures and methods, still at least 20% is 
left for irrationality (Zehnder, 1986). Other studies, consider it to be even greater (up to 40%) 
(Kinicki & Lockwood, 1985).  
Some more figures: only 35% of the American companies  are likely to use structured 
interviews and 28% use cognitive tests (Sanchez, 1994). In Germany, where this investigation 
was carried out, the situation is even worse (Litzcke, 2003). Psychological tests for personnel 
selection of top managers were used in less than 10% of cases, opposite to the United King-
dom (70%) (Bungard, 2000). Standardized interviews are known to have at least double as 
high validity than unstructured interviews. It might be explained through very early decision 
making and impression management of the candidates. People gather impressions about each 
other in the first seconds when meeting each other (Schmid, Hipp & Caspari, 1999). Image, 
concrete behavior and personality are saved in our brain as traits being a conclusion of moni-
toring behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Mistakes in interpersonal judgments made privately 
do not usually have dramatic consequences, but result in a very expensive Personnel Selec-
tion. Such mistakes in interpersonal judgments as Hello Effects, Expectancy Effects etc. are 
described in the scientific literature (e.g. Kanning, 1999). For example, your hand shaking 
determines your chances of selection. 
Recruitment starts with screening application materials. More than 80% of German 
companies stated to use application documents for external personnel selection (Schuler, 
2001).  Recruiters focus their attention first on the application documents perceived as rele-
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vant to the job, such as educational achievements and reported skills or hobbies. In reality, 
evaluation of application forms is more spontaneous than systematic (Mell, 1988).  In addition 
to gathering factual data, recruiters apparently make inferences from resume information re-
garding subjective applicant attributes, such as personality (Kirkwood & Ralston, 1999), and 
use these inferences in determining initial employability (Brown & Campion, 1994; Dindoff, 
1999). Despite the fact that such conclusions are not always consistent or legal, it is generally 
accepted that recruiters frequently form impressions from resume data that go far beyond the 
education, work experience, and activity reported on applicants’ resumes (Cable & Gilovich, 
1998). Study 1 investigate the effectiveness of intuitive and rational decision making when 
screening applicants’ resumes. 
Employment interview is also very popular in the Recruitment and Selection practice. 
Study 2 tests the effectiveness of the intuitive and rational interpersonal judgments during the 
employment interview. The "essential character" of the interview is being understood as "dy-
namic interaction between two people" (Yonge, 1956, p. 27), and this might be the reason 
why unstructured interviews among practitioners. Interviewers may prefer the freedom of 
unstructured interviews in order to communicate the organization's values, and qualitatively 
assess candidate fit (Macan & Dipboye, 1994). However, the use of prompts and follow-up 
questions is a primary means by which interviewers might bias information gathering (Macan 
& Dipboye, 1994). Study 3 and 4, described in the Chapter 3, continue the research and inves-
tigate information processing when handling the results of the standardized methods, taking 
recommendations or observing participants in the group discussions. 
Professional judgment is expected to be based on conscious differentiation between 
the observation of the concrete behavior and the generalization of the personality traits of the 
person being observed (Kanning, 1999). Intuitive judgment  is “reached by an informal and 
unstructured mode of reasoning, without the use of analytic methods or deliberate calculation” 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1996, p. 124). According to these definitions, Human Resource 
practitioners may not be intuitive because it is unprofessional.  
Yet where are the mistakes of the interpersonal judgments hidden? Trope (1986) has 
argued that people perception has two major components: behavioral identification and at-
tributional inference (p. 733). When we gather information about the other person, we are 
likely to receive it visually and much less acoustically (Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & 
Archer, 1979). It explains, why attractive candidates are preferred over the less attractive ones 
(Schuler, 2001). Other findings consider that even very brief, such as one-minute or even 
shorter, presentation  produce consensual and mildly valid inferences (Albright, Kenny & 
Malloy, 1988).  
Not only observation, but also attributional inferences can be a source of error in the 
interpersonal judgment. Verbal and nonverbal clues affect the conclusions about personality 
traits and influence the final decisions. When a person seems to look confident or dominant, 
silence is interpreted as expressing power, or in the opposite way, as long as the person 
looked shy. Empirical studies tested the influence of just one information on general evalua-
tion made about a person (like glasses or no-glasses) (e.g. Thornton, 1943; Asch, 1946). 
These evaluations have direct influence on the selection decisions made. For example, Cole, 
Feild, Giles & Harris (2004) have found that Conscientiousness correlated with the employ-
ability ratings for Conventional jobs (e.g., accounting), while Extraversion was most associ-
ated with employability ratings for Enterprising jobs (e.g., marketing). However, beyond 
Dunn, Mount, Barrick, and Ones’ (1995) study that reported managers’ perceptions of hypo-
thetical applicants’ personality traits as important constructs in evaluating their employability, 
there are few studies that have assessed the relationship between recruiters’ inferences of ap-
plicant personality traits with their assessments of applicants’ employability (Wayne, 1998). 
Organisational practitioners understand the importance of further training of the diag-
nostic qualities and intuition (Agor, 1989). The need for further research of the intuitive deci-
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sion making in the personnel selection was also recognized by the organizational psycholo-
gists (Morris, 1991; Kriz, Loth, Hesse & Hargen, 2001). Intuition is especially important at 
situations with high levels of uncertainty, no previous experience, under time pressure and 
with information shortages (Agor, 1989). Other authors advise rationality for making deci-
sions in stressful situations (Lazar, 1999).  
The importance of cognitive styles in the personnel selection has two sides. On one 
side, the cognitive style of Human Resource practitioners plays a role in the decision making. 
On the other side, the cognitive style of the future employees needs to be taken into account 
as well. In this case, opinions differ not only between scientists and practitioners, but also 
among the researchers. Highly intuitive  managers performed significantly better on making 
strategic decisions than people with low level of intuition (Cosier & Aplin, 1982) and intuitive 
team members were more likely to be selected as group leaders (Armstrong & Priola, 2001). 
Other studies have found rational participants to be much more effective than intuitive (e.g. 
Priola et al., 2004), and authors explain this performance difference as being due to the differ-
ent environments (organic versus mechanic). This hypothesis has been supported by other 
research. For instance, in high-tech environments, sales growth rates were found to be higher 
when the technocracy dimension of decision making style structure were negatively related, 
the opposite valid for the low-tech environments (Covin, Slevin & Heeley, 2001). This cur-
rent program of research has conducted studies both in the mechanic and organic environ-
ments. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the studies conducted in the laboratory setting. Chapter 4 
deals with the performance of different intuitive, rational and heterogeneous learning teams in 
the natural or organic setting.  
Conclusion 
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Ubel & Lowenstein (1997) stress “the relative importance of intuition and systematic-
ity”, in order to find out in what situation intuitive decision making is superior (p. 647). Study 
1 to 4 report the results of experiments made in order to find out, which of the cognitive styles 
(Intuitive or Rational) should be used in the personnel selection. Study 1 tests the quality of 
such decisions when screening applications. Intuitive, spontaneous and rational, systematic 
ways of studying application materials were compared. In the Study 2, Ss were supposed to 
evaluate video interviews of applicants. Study 3 has studied the way, intuitive and rational Ss 
were dealing with the test scores of different applicants. Study 4 included a video with a 
group discussion made during the Assessment Center. Team performance of the homogene-
ous intuitive, rational and heterogeneous groups are described in the Study 5. Differences in 
the information selection and information processing of intuitive and rational individuals were 
studied as well. To sum up, this dissertation aims to research intuitive decision making in the 
personnel selection when using different information selection methods. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPARISON OF RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE COGNITIVE STYLES IN SCREEN-
ING APPLICATONS AND INTERVIEWING CANDIDATES 
Prior research has yielded considerable evidence of standardized methods as having 
higher validity in personnel selection processes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, intuitive decision 
making in the personnel selection process is calling for more differentiated  research (Morris, 
1991; Kriz, Loth, Hesse & Hargen, 2001). 
The present studies tested whether intuition was helpful in the most popular stages of 
personnel selection, such as screening of application materials and during the employment 
interview. Study 1 tested the hypothesis if intuition is helpful when dealing with acceding 
amounts of information (e.g. application maps), which is proposed by organizational practi-
tioners (Agor, 1989 etc.). We also examine the combination of intuitive and rational styles. 
Study 2 focused on the interpersonal judgments during the employment interview. Results 
revealed that intuition was quite helpful in situations when abundant amounts of information 
were supposed to be evaluated, as in the case of application screening. In the cases of em-
ployment interviews, the opposite was valid – intuition was found to be less effective than 
rationality. Intuitive participants failed to make correct judgments about the people they liked.  
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of the personnel selection practitioners’ was to develop selection instruments 
useful for predicting candidates’ future performance.  Of much less importance were the ques-
tions examining the reason why selection instruments work and what it is that they exactly 
measured (Lievens et al., 2002). Personnel selection has also been criticised for its intuitive 
character. This intuitive character could be explained by the fact that personnel managers are 
found to be intuitive (Agor, 1989). It is expected that a professional judgment is based on 
conscious differentiation between the observation of the concrete behavior and the generaliza-
tion of the personality traits of the person being observed (Kanning,  1999).  Selection instru-
ments are selected on preference and cost factors, empirical evidence of their utility is usually 
ignored (e.g. Guion, 1998). This dissertation will focus on the combination of the intuitive 
and rational cognitive styles with intuitive or rational methods in different personnel selection 
tasks in order to determine whether rationality, intuition or their combination is better for the 
personnel selection purposes. 
Intuitive and Rational Cognitive Styles 
In order to define rational and intuitive types, the personality dimension specified in 
the Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994 and Epstein et al., 1996) was 
used. According to CEST, people process information in two parallel interacting systems, 
rational and experiential (intuitive). The, rational mode is deliberative and analytic, primarily 
verbal, conscious, and functions via a person’s understanding of the conventional rules of 
logic, and the rational style is slow, and suited for dispassionate analysis. Contrary to this, the 
experiential mode is intuitive, automatic, rapid, associative, and holistic, representing events 
in the form of concrete exemplars rather than abstract symbols. The experiential style is 
shaped by emotionally significant past experience, and is outcome- rather than process-
oriented, suited to rapid assessment of information and decisive action. The two systems are 
found to operate synchronically in parallel and interact with each other. The findings of sev-
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eral studies provided qualitative and quantitative support for the independent existence of the 
experiential and rational systems (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, & Heier, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Rational processing was associated with 
normative judgments, constructive, action-oriented coping and academic achievements. In-
tuitive processing was associated with heuristic judgments, affectively positive, although 
naive and unrealistic thinking patterns (Epstein et al., 1996; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). 
Application Screening 
The personnel selection process starts with screening of application forms or resumes, 
and it is one of the methods most widely used for selection purposes. The idea that past be-
havior is the best predictor of future performance makes human resource managers decide if 
the applicant is going to be a good worker or not. Applications usually consist of background 
information, such as personal data, education, working experience and hobbies. Different 
countries have different standards for job applications. For instance, in Germany (where this 
study was carried out), a very detailed description of your person is expected. The resume 
includes photo, age, gender, family status, detailed description of your work experience and 
recommendations from every working place. In other countries you are obliged to make a 
statement about your physical health. American resumes seem to be the most anonymous – 
no age, no gender, no photo, and no longer than two pages. Two sources of error are typical 
for the application screening: selection of non-optimal candidates and the rejection of highly 
qualified candidates. The costs for mistakenly placed candidate are thought to be higher than 
for denied qualified candidates, despite the fact that most application screening decisions are 
negative. In praxis, decisions on applications are made more intuitively than systematically 
(Mell, 1988). Negative decisions were made mostly based on the formal aspects of a resume 
applied, as long as positive decisions were done due to the content of the previous experi-
ence. Study 1 compares the decision effectiveness made by intuitive and rational participants. 
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Employment Interview 
People have beliefs about personalities of the other people based on one or more ob-
servable characteristics, which lead to the conclusion about other, non-observable, traits. This 
process was described by Cronbach (1955) as implicit personality theories, and this phenom-
ena can be found in the experiments of Asch (1946) etc.. The best chance to gather informa-
tion about the candidate is during the employment interview. An interview is usually the sec-
ond step in the personnel selection process. The potential employer has a chance to ask the 
future employee about his motivation and professional background, but also the candidate 
does have a possibility to learn more about the company. The candidate has the opportunity to 
see the possible future working place, and the Human Resource Manager may use sensing 
channels to gather verbal and non-verbal information about the candidate. Doing so, it is not 
only possible to  “read from face”, but also to “read into face” of the potential employee (Gil-
bert, Pelham & Krull, 1988). The traits which are read from the targets’ faces changed the 
interpretation of the verbal statement. For example, a confident candidate was judged as pow-
erful, even when keeping silent. The opposite was valid for unconfident or shy person. This 
problem might be the case of quite a few experts and less for the sales persons. Other mis-
takes in the interpersonal perception are known as “Hello Effect”, “Sequence Effect” and oth-
ers are described by researchers. Examples for Hello effects: attractive people are described in 
a better way than unattractive ones (Dion, Berscheid & Walster, 1972), or people with glasses 
are considered to be more intelligent, etc. These conclusions have a direct impact on selection 
decisions. Attractive people have higher chances of being selected (Marlowe, Schneider & 
Nelson, 1996). Sequence effect comes in force when a row and time of candidate presentation 
plays an important role in their evaluation. The impressions gathered about the candidates 
tend to resist despite of the performance decline (see Jones et al., 1968). The same is valid 
also for such stable personality traits like intelligence, where behavioral changes are sub-
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scribed to such situational conditions as “luck” or “circumstance” (Obermann, 2002). These 
and other mistakes, mentioned above, are especially valid when non-standardized, unstruc-
tured interviews are applied. The preference of human resource managers for unstructured 
interviews was described in Chapter 1. To sum-up, structured employment interviews define 
content more explicitly, have higher validity (0.56) and interrater reliability (0.67) in compari-
son to the unstructured interviews (reliability of 0.34), being still widely preferred by organi-
zations (Graves & Karren, 1996). Unstructured interviews are not only less valid, but also 
legally indefensible in numerous countries (McDaniel, Whetzel, Schmidt & Maurer, 1994). In 
Study 2 structured interviews were applied to increase the validity of the interpersonal evalua-
tions. Attribution processes, or the way we attribute the behavior of others to the traits of the 
person, fail to take the situational factors into account. A specific example from the current 
context of personnel selection, is the nervousness that often occurs during an interview. De-
pending on how often a particular behavior is observed or how often it was earlier performed, 
the behavior is often subscribed to the person, situation or other factors. When perceiving 
others, it is important to assess whether the particular behavior was caused by the participant 
in order to be noticed, or rather could it be explained by the circumstances of the situation 
(Orvis et al., 1975). Selection interview takes, as a rule, one hour, which seems to be not that 
long to make long-term conclusions about the other person’s future performance. In a study 
by McArthur & Post (1977), the tendency for a stronger attribution of behavior to personality 
traits was especially found for more noticeable (attractive) people than for less noticeable. 
Another factor, which does have an influence on the personality judgment, is sympathy, and is 
based on the perception of similarity.  Similarity was found to lead to positive performance 
appraisal (Obermann, 2002). Prejudice is another source of error, occurring when assimilative 
processes dominate, and all members of a given class of objects or people are regarded as 
functionally equivalent (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991), and there is a refusal to accommodate 
(to) variations. Festinger (1957) describes a similar process in his Cognitive Dissonance The-
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ory: if beliefs are held sufficiently strongly, people may go through remarkable psychological 
contortions in order to assimilate new information to the existing beliefs, rather than accom-
modating the beliefs to the information.  
Present Research 
The main question of the present research is the effectiveness of intuitive and rational 
decision making in different stages of the personnel selection. During, for example, screening 
applications (Study 1) or during employment interviews (Study 2). Employment interviews, 
along with application screening are the most widely used methods in personnel selection 
(Schuler et al., 1993). Is intuition just a short-termed possibility to cut the costs and save time 
needed for more detailed evaluation? The goal of this research is not to determine why human 
resource managers use less valid methods than recommended, but rather to find out if the 
combination of intuitive and rational cognitive styles improves the quality of judgment. It is 
also our goal to determine if a personal cognitive styles influence decision making. Can “ra-
tional” people make intuitive decisions, and can “intuitive” people make rational decisions? A 
further area of focus (Study 2) are intuitive and rational methods of interpersonal perception 
during the employment interview. The research in this field has high practical value, as long 
as the improved personnel decisions bring financial benefits to organizations (Schmitt & 
Cann, 1998). 
STUDY 1 
Participants were asked to evaluate the resumes of various applicants for a Sales Man-
ager position in order to define the best candidate, which resulted in a range of candidates 
from best to worst. After reading the job description, participants were instructed  to read 
through the applications to identify the best candidates they would like to invite for an appli-
cation interview. The Ss in the rational condition were asked to list different criteria, valid for 
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the position, such as years of relevant working experience, educational background. Pretesting 
ensured that the two working modes depicted different cognitive strategies.
METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants in this study were 55 students (36 females and 19 
males) recruited on the campus of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. The age of 
participants ranged from 20 to 67 years (M = 27.56, SD = 10.44). Participants received either 
credit toward their course requirement in Psychology or a monetary compensation of 5 Euro 
(approximately $7). A 2x2 matrix design was applied involving cognitive style (rational or 
intuitive) and method (intuitive or rational. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental conditions. Some other studies are known to engage students in for the evalua-
tion of the CVs (e.g. Conway & Peneno, 1999; Watkins & Johnston, 2000). 
 Procedure. Participants arrived one by one at the laboratory room. They  have re-
ceived the job description for a Sales Manager position. The job description was a one-page 
description of the tasks, responsibilities and expectations of the position. Participants received 
six different resumes and were instructed to read these resumes through in order to decide 
which of the candidates is most suitable for the position stated in the job description. Resumes 
consisted of a two or three pages. No photos were attached to the resumes, gender was also 
omitted. All of the candidates were approximately of the same age group (35 to 40 years). The 
resumes were very detailed, with extra recommendations from the previous working places 
and descriptions of the previous projects made. After reading the job description, participants 
received the resumes to work through and had to decide which candidate was the best. At the 
second step, they had to range the candidates. 
 Intuition vs. rationality induction procedure. After some brief instructions, participants 
engaged in reading the job description and the resumes. The written instructions asked par-
ticipants in the rational condition to fill in the table with the factors relevant to the job, men-
tioned above for each and every participant. Participants were asked to make their decisions 
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step-by-step. After this was completed, Ss determined who should be invited for an interview. 
Participants in the intuitive condition received a short statement about the importance of intui-
tive decision making, and were asked to make a spontaneous, intuitive decision. All partici-
pants were asked if they made their decision intuitively or rationally. Cognitive style 
measure. A Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, 1996) standardized questionnaire 
was used to measure the preferences for the intuitive or rational cognitive style. REI was con-
structed to quantify individual preference for intuition, understood in this study as a purely 
affective mode and not as a heuristic-affective mode which was assumed by Epstein (1996), 
and deliberation, understood as a reflective, cognition-based mode. Participants were in-
structed to complete the questionnaire either before or after the selection task, randomly. Par-
ticipants answered each question on a 5-point Likert scale (1=not at all; 5=very much). After 
the participants accomplished these questions, they were thanked for participating and given 
their credit point or money. Exploratory factor analysis (SPSS) revealed two factors, corre-
sponding to the scales Faith in Intuition (FI) and Need for Cognition (NC) of the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI; Keller et al., 2000). The reliability of the FI scale was above 
0.86, almost the same as for the Faith in Intuition scale, 0.87. High interitem reliability was 
also mentioned by the authors of the German REI (Keller et al., 2000). REI was applied ran-
domly before or after application screening.
Dependent measures. Participants were instructed to make a personnel selection deci-
sion to invite at least one of the candidates to an employment interview, based on the informa-
tion received from reading the resumes. As stated above, resumes included a detailed descrip-
tion of the former work experience and educational background of the candidates. After com-
pletion of the reading of these resumes, participants were asked to range the candidates and 
select at least one of them to be invited to the interview. Students received points for the cor-
rectly “placed” candidates.  
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In order to define the best candidate and the correct range of candidates, ten Human 
Resource Officers were asked to screen the selected resumes for the position mentioned 
above. We have used the difference between the range of candidates, selected by the profes-
sionals and the range made by the participants of the study. The higher the difference, the 
fewer points were given to the participant. 
Suspicion check. Three students were elected from the experiment due to the language 
problems. They reported some difficulties in understanding position description and reading 
the resumes. 
RESULTS 
Significant difference was found in the quality of the personnel decision made by in-
tuitive and rational respondents in the step-by-step or spontaneous condition. Sex  and age of 
the participants had no effect on the dependent variable nor were there any significant interac-
tions. Thus, these variables are not considered further.
Manipulation check. To assess whether the cognitive inducement task produced the in-
tended effect on participants, the self-evaluation score (with 1 - “I decided intuitively” and 10 
- “The decision was made rationally”)  was subjected to a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Results revealed a significant main effect for the decision made F(1, 53) = 37.23, 
p< .001, η² = .42. Further statistics showed that participants in the rational condition (M = 
6.48, SD = 2.364) reported their decision making as more rational  than intuitive. Participants 
in the intuitive condition (M =  3.00, SD = 1.694) reported their decision was made intui-
tively. Thus, the manipulation was successful.
Cognitive styles. To assess whether the cognitive style produced the intended effect on 
the results achieved by the participants, the cognitive style score was subjected to a one-way 
analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) performed in SPSS. Results revealed a significant 
main effect for cognitive style F(1, 53) = 4.061, p< .05. The findings show that participants 
with the intuitive cognitive style (M = 9.25, SD = 1.972) achieved better results than partici-
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pants with a rational cognitive style (M = 7.85, SD = 3.072). In general, 73% of males, and 
only 47% of females were found to be rational. Despite that this effect was not significant, 
women participating in the experiment were more intuitive than men.
Cognitive styles under rational and intuitive conditions. A 2 (cognitive style) x 2 
(condition)  analysis in a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant two-
way interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition.  F(1, 51) = 
18.624, p< .000, η² = .267. The main effects for cognitive style F(1, 51) = 4.495, p< .05, η² = 
= .081, and for the condition F(1, 51) = 8.012, p< .05, η² = .136 were significant as well. In-
tuitive participants. Participants with the intuitive cognitive style (M = 10.00, SD =  
= 1.957) achieved better results in when working with tables than when making intuitive deci-
sions, but these results did not reach significance (M = 8.72, SD =  1.848, p > .05).  
Rational participants. Participants with the rational cognitive style made worse decisions 
when working with tables (M =  5.85, SD = 2.537) and better when asked to decide intuitively 
(M = 9.588, SD = 2.032, p < .05).  
Results of Study 1 show that both intuitive and rational participants received better results 
when making spontaneous decisions (M = 9.41, SD = 1.972) than when following a step-by-
step procedure (M = 7.90, SD = 2.22, p = .034).  Means and standard deviations are displayed 
in Tables 1 and 2 and also in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Performance of intuitive and rational cognitive participants  
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Table 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational participants in the 
step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        5.85   2.537      14  10.00  1.95      13  
Intuitive 9.58 2.032      17  8.72   1.84      11 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational cognitive style and 
step-by-step versus spontaneous condition 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Condition       7.90*  2.92    31  9.41*  1.976    24 
Cognitive Style 7.85*  3.072    27  9.25* 1.974    28 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
DISCUSSION 
 Replicating some of the previous studies, Study 1 revealed that intuitive cognitive 
style outperformed the rational one (e.g. Hammond et al., 1987).  The results of this study also 
confirm the opinion of practitioners (e.g. Agor, 1991) that intuition is helpful when evaluating 
large amounts of information. In our study, participants were confronted with the application 
material of different candidates, including resumes, recommendations and other more or less 
relevant information. Rational participants had difficulties evaluating the relevance of the 
supported information. Intuitive participants managed this information evaluation with less 
troubles. At the same time, when the intuitive participants were asked to make a decision in 
the rational condition, they received even better results than when deciding just intuitively. 
Rational participants also made better decisions when asked to decide intuitively. We support 
the opinion of the other authors about the necessity to specify task properties and define the 
cognitive styles (Hammond et al., 1987). Further studies are needed to continue the research 
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in order to find out if the achieved results are also valid for the other personnel selection pro-
cedures, for example, Employment Interview or Assessment Center.  
In this study we have also investigated if women are more intuitive than men. Support-
ing some previous analysis (e.g. Hall, 1979; Lieberman, 2000), the findings support the hy-
pothesis that females are more intuitive than males. In sum, the view of the organizational 
practitioners has been supported. Intuitive decision making can be applied successfully when 
screening applications and resumes. According to the results, we stress the importance of ex-
perts knowing their cognitive styles and analyzing the way they perform the tasks.   
STUDY 2 
Study 2 aimed to investigate the efficacy of the intuitive cognitive style in the em-
ployment interview. Despite the findings of many researchers that standardized procedures 
are more valid and reliable, organizational practitioners consider intuition to be better. We 
have investigated whether step-by-step versus spontaneous, intuitive procedure is better, and 
if so then under which circumstances. Participants were shown a video with structured inter-
views of two male candidates considered to be equally attractive. After watching this video, 
participants were instructed  to judge the personality qualities of the applicants. Pretesting 
ensured that the two working modes depicted different cognitive strategies. 
METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants in this study were 62 students (36 females and 26 
males) who were recruited on the campus of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. 
Participants’ age ranged between 19 to 40 years (M = 23.27, SD = 3.70). They received ex-
perimental credit toward their course requirement in psychology or a monetary compensation 
of 5 Euro (approximately $7). A 2 (cognitive style: rational vs. intuitive) x 2 (method: intui-
tive vs. rational) between-participants factorial design was employed. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Other studies are known to use similar 
design (e.g. Borkenau & Liebler, 1992). 
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 Procedure. Participants arrived one by one at the laboratory room. After a brief in-
struction, they were shown a video with two employment interviews. The interviews were 
structured and included such questions as: “What do you like the most when performing your 
job? What are your hobbies?” Etc. Participants were asked to about the personal qualities of 
the candidates interviewed. At the beginning, the first candidate was judged. For example, if 
he is more warm or cold, reserved, dominant etc. After this evaluation was made, participants 
were asked about the agreeableness of the candidate, if they like him or not. The procedure 
was repeated with the second candidate. Participants were also asked about their mood at the 
moment and how sure they were about the decisions they made.  
Cognitive style measure. The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, 1996) 
was used to measure the preferences for the intuitive or rational cognitive style. The reliability 
of the scales was evaluated using Reliability Analysis in SPSS The reliability, with the Cron-
bachs Alpha of the Faith in Intuition about .79, as well as for the scale Need for Cognition of 
about .74. Like in the Study 1, REI was randomly applied before or after the interview. 
Intuition vs. rationality induction procedure. After some brief instructions, participants 
engaged watching the employment interviews on a video. The written instructions asked par-
ticipants in the rational condition to fill in the table with the lists of different personality crite-
ria. Participants in the intuitive condition were asked to describe the persons behavior. Ss in 
the intuitive condition have received a short statement about the importance of the intuitive 
decision making and were asked to make a spontaneous, intuitive decision. We also asked 
participants if they have actually made their decision intuitively.  
Dependent measures. Participants were instructed to describe the behavior of the can-
didates they have seen in the video. The personality description included such constructs as 
social competence, logical thinking, emotional stability, dominance, warmth etc. In order to 
get a criterion, candidates filmed, were asked to fill in the 16 Personality-Factor-Test (16 PF). 
The self-evaluation of the candidate and the evaluation of the participants was compared with 
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the evaluation of the participants. The less was the difference between the self-evaluation of 
the candidate, the more points they received. 
RESULTS 
Significant difference was found in the personality evaluation made by intuitive and 
rational respondents in the own or compensatory condition. Sex  and age of the participants 
had no effect on the dependent variable nor were there any significant interactions. Thus, this 
variable is not considered further. 
Manipulation check. To assess whether the cognitive inducement task produced the in-
tended effect on participants, the self-evaluation on the decision made with maximum 10 for 
the rationality  and minimum 1 for the intuitive decision made. The correlation between the 
rational and intuitive decision making was r = -.27, p < .05. Thus, we created a difference 
score by subtracting rational decision making from the intuitive. The difference score was 
subjected to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results revealed a significant main 
effect for the decision made F(1, 60) = 12.83, p< .001, η² = .17. Further statistics showed that 
participants in the rational condition (M = 5.68, SD = 2.741) reported their decision making as 
more rational than intuitive. Participants in the intuitive condition (M =  3.48, SD = 1.868) 
reported their decision was made intuitively. Thus, the manipulation was successful.
Cognitive styles.  In order to find out if the intuitive cognitive style was better in the 
interpersonal evaluation, the cognitive style score was subjected to a one-way analysis of 
variance (one-way ANOVA). Results revealed a significant main effect for cognitive style 
F(1, 58) = 5.009, p< .05.  The results have shown that participants with the intuitive cognitive 
style (M = 8.36, SD = 1.931) achieved worse results than participants with a rational cognitive 
style (M = 9.72, SD = 2.837). 
Cognitive styles under rational and intuitive conditions. A 2 (cognitive style) x 2 
(condition)  analysis in a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant two-
way interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition.  F(1, 58) =  
36
= 12.979, p=.001, η² = .183. The main effects for cognitive style F(1, 58) = 5.557, p< .05, η² =  
= .087, and for the condition F(1, 58) = 4.247, p< .05, η² = .068 were significant as well. In-
tuitive participants. Further analysis showed that participants with the intuitive cognitive style 
(M = 10.10, SD = 1.969) achieved better results using step-by-step approach than when mak-
ing spontaneous decisions (M = 6.91, SD = 2.898, p = 0.005).  
Rational participants. Participants with the rational cognitive style were worse when using 
step-by-step procedure (M = 9.400, SD = 1.731) and slightly better when making intuitive 
decisions (M = 10.26, SD = 2.181, p > 0.05).  
For both cognitive styles, results were slightly better in the step-by-step procedure (M = 9.60, 
SD = 1.801)  than when making spontaneous decisions, but this difference failed to reach the  
significance (M = 8.77, SD = 2.931, p = .177). The interaction is displayed graphically in the 
Figure 3 and Tables 3 and 4.  
Figure 3. Performance of intuitive and rational cognitive participants  
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Table 3.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational participants in the 
step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        9.40   1.732    25  10.26 2.186     15 
Intuitive 10.10   1.969    10  6.91 2.678     12 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational cognitive style and 
step-by-step versus spontaneous condition 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Condition       9.60  1.802    35  8.77 2.913     27 
Cognitive Style 9.72*  1.934    40  8.36* 2.837     22 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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We asked the participants about their feeling of certainty in the decision made. There 
was no significant difference found in the feeling of certainty between the rational and intui-
tive participants. Participants were also asked about their impressions about the candidates 
before and after the interview. There was no significant correlation between the evaluation of 
liking or disliking someone before and after the interview. Significant negative correlation of 
r = -.538, p< .05 was found between finding candidate nice and the judgmental accuracy of 
the candidate for the participants with the intuitive cognitive style. This means that intuitive 
people make more mistakes when judging someone when they like the object being judged. 
There was no significant correlation between the evaluation of the more/less nice candidate 
and the judgmental accuracy made by rational people.
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 These two studies show that the combination of the cognitive style and the way people 
process tasks can improve their performance in the personnel selection procedures.  There is 
very little literature about the intuitive decision making in personnel selection. Some authors 
stressed the importance of the future research in this field, in order to minimize the gap be-
tween the scientific research and practical methods used in organizations. Scientists recom-
mend the usage of the standardized methods and procedures, in order to eliminate disturbing 
effects, such as, Hello Effect, Sequence Effect. However, practitioners swear on using intui-
tion and consider it to be of high importance, especially for processing large amounts of in-
formation. Personnel selection is a process with many steps, including application/resume 
screening, interviews, assessment centers and other methods, such as cognitive tests, personal-
ity tests etc. The goal of this dissertation is to find out which situations are better suited for 
intuition, and in which cases standardized procedures are better. The results of Study 1 sup-
ported the findings of cognitive researchers about the priority of the intuitive cognitive style 
(e.g. Whitecotton & Sanders, 1998; Hatsopoulos & Hatsopolos, 1999). In Study 1, intuitive 
decision making was found to be more accurate when screening resumes and applications of 
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different candidates. Applications included not only resumes, but also recommendations and 
self-descriptions of the projects fulfilled. The findings supported the opinion of organizational 
practitioners that intuition is a good method in cases of abundant information. Study 2 tested 
whether intuition is less helpful when making interpersonal judgments in the employment 
interview. Intuition was found to be less effective than rationality, especially in the case when 
a candidate was liked. Rational people were immune against the influence of feelings, and 
could judge the candidate accurately even when this candidate was liked or disliked. Despite 
the moderate difference in the performance of different participants in the intuitive and ra-
tional conditions, the judgmental efficacy in the employment interview is explained more by 
the mistakes, typical for the intuitive cognitive style, such as “blindness” toward the more 
preferred candidate. 
Limitations 
The sample of the two experiments is mainly comprised of students. The students were 
generally studying in the higher semesters with the major or minor in Psychology and had 
some background in the personnel selection. The experiments were made in the laboratory 
setting, which is characterized as a mechanical setting and, according to some authors (e.g. 
Armstrong & Priola, 2001), and consequently participants with the intuitive style are likely to 
perform worse than in the organic, natural setting. The future studies should study the per-
formance of  the intuitive and rational participants in the organic setting. Another point refers 
to the comparison between the performance efficacy of the intuitive and rational candidates. 
This performance was made indirectly (person versus model) and not directly (a person’s in-
tuitive processes versus a person’s analytical processes), which is recommended by 
Hammond et al. (1987). We have decided ourselves for indirect comparisons, which is a more 
traditional method. Future research with the direct comparison of the intuitive and rational 
decision making of one participant is needed. Further studies should investigate the differ-
ences in the decision processing of the participants with the intuitive and rational styles. 
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Implications  
The study supported findings regarding the application of the standardized methods in 
the employment process and, at the same time, supports the opinion of many practitioners that 
intuition is useful when working with big amounts of information. The practical implications 
of these studies refer to the appropriate usage of the intuitive and rational cognitive styles. 
The personnel selection literature described many different effects influencing expert judg-
ments during the employment interviews. Unfortunately, these findings are seldom used in the 
organizational setting which leads to false placements and higher costs than when appropriate 
personnel selection methods are used. Personnel managers have been found to hire their em-
ployees simply by luck and intuition (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002). A correct combination of the 
cognitive styles of personnel managers and appropriate judgment methods could cut the costs 
for these false judgments. To sum up, the combination of intuitive decision making with ra-
tional, standardized methods results in a very high quality of judgment, especially when inter-
viewing candidates. Intuition might be used in early stages of screening applications and re-
sumes reducing the information to be evaluated in a time-effective way.  
CONCLUSION 
 There are many articles recommending the use of standardized procedures in the per-
sonnel selection procedure and describing effects influencing personnel judgments. Intuition 
was found to be disturbing in the interpersonal judgments, but very few studies have concen-
trated on evaluating judgmental qualities in different stages of the personnel selection process. 
To sum-up, intuition should not be completely ignored in the personnel selection, but rather 
used more appropriately. Our findings suggest implying spontaneous, intuitive decision mak-
ing in the first step of the personnel selection when screening the resumes. A standardized, 
step-by-step procedure should be used for the employment interview. For intuitive Human 
Resource practitioners, it is important to note that judgmental mistakes are not excluded even 
in the structured interviews, especially if the candidate is likeable.   
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPARING EFFECTIVENESS OF RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE COGNITIVE 
STYLES IN PROCESSING ASSESSMENT CENTER SCORES  
Studies 3 and 4 extend previous work on the effectiveness of the intuitive and rational 
cognitive styles in the different stages of personnel selection. In these studies, we also investi-
gated additional theoretical processes by which the differences in the effectiveness of the de-
cision making occur. Our findings supported the results of the Studies 1 and 2 and revealed 
that intuitive decisions were better when processing information, and rationality was more 
effective in interpersonal judgments. 
Although prior research has found standardized methods as having higher validity in 
the personnel selection processes, it has been unable to offer acceptable reasons for their ef-
fectiveness. However, very few studies have investigated intuition in personnel selection. The 
present program of studies extends the research on the effectiveness of intuitive decision mak-
ing in different stages and conditions, and it continues the research exploring whether the 
combination of cognitive styles improves the judgmental accuracy. Study 3 and 4 investigated 
information processing of the both cognitive styles. Study 3 tested whether intuitive partici-
pants were more likely to search for supporting information than rational. Study 4 investi-
gated the learning styles of both types. 
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INTRODUCTION 
DIFFERENCE OF THE  INTUITIVE AND RATIONAL COGNITIVE PROCESSING  IN 
THE PERSONNEL SELECTION 
Personnel selection has been criticised by scientific researchers for its intuitive interpersonal 
perception (e.g. Guion, 1998, Obermann, 2002 etc.). Despite extensive scientific research in 
organizational (Mell 1988 etc.), and clinical settings (Wiesflecker & Kubinger, 2005), Human 
Resource practitioners continue to use non-standardized methods (Graves & Karren, 1996), 
attributing their successful decisions to intuition (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002).  Personnel selec-
tion is not a one-step process. Each step includes information gathering and information 
evaluation. Among personnel selection methods the following are very popular: application 
screening, interview, Assessment Centers, personality or intelligence tests, and job perform-
ance tasks. Study 3 and 4 test the efficacy of the intuitive and rational cognitive styles when 
evaluating candidate performance during the employment interview and when handling the 
Assessment Center results. Both Study 3 and Study 4 test the hypothesis that participants with 
different cognitive styles have different learning preferences, and are likely to handle new 
information in a different way.  
Information Selection 
Human Resource practitioners are confronted with vast amounts of new information 
that needs to be processed very quickly. A part of this information is manipulative (like self-
selling phrases in the application letter or a very good photo), some of this information is less 
relevant, sometimes it is faked, and sometimes information is missing. Human Resource man-
agers tend to consider verbal or written recommendations of the candidates, for example, from 
the previous supervisor or colleague.  In some cases, such recommendations are taken into 
account, and in some cases they are not. Research in the field of getting expert advice has 
been carried out by only a few researchers (e.g. Ubel & Loewenstein, 1997), for example with 
patients (Siminoff & Petting, 1989). A recent study by Jonas & Frey (2003) investigated the 
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information search in advisor-client interactions. Considering such previous research, this 
study asks participants to select the recommendations they would like to read about the candi-
dates. These recommendations were provided by the former colleagues of the preferred can-
didate. In Studies 3 and 4 we investigate the information processing of the intuitive and ra-
tional participants. 
Within the bounds of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964), a whole body of re-
search suggests that in order to reduce post-decisional conflicts people often prefer informa-
tion supporting their choice, as opposed to information conflicting with it (for an overview see 
Frey, 1986; Frey, Schulz-Hardt, & Stahlberg, 1996).This tendency has been called “confirma-
tion bias” (e.g., Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Leuthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). This has been shown in 
the area of attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), expectations in negotiations (Pinkley, Grif-
fith, & Northcraft, 1995), decisions (Frey, 1986; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; 
Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002) and in group discussions (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüth-
gens & Moscovici, 2000). Selective information search was found to negatively influence the 
decision accuracy (Kray & Galinski, 2003). Counterfactual mindsets were found to increase 
cognitive flexibility and assist in overcoming functional fixed. In a study by Galinsky & 
Moskowitz (2000), individuals were more likely to solve a problem in cases where they were 
primed with a counterfactual mind-set.  In Study 3 and 4, we examine whether confirmation 
will influence the decision quality. We aim to find out, if rational or intuitive participants are 
looking for more supporting or conflicting information. The results of Study 2 show that in-
tuitive participants made poor decisions on interpersonal judgments in cases where they liked 
the candidate evaluated. In Studies 3 and 4 we intend to discover whether intuitive partici-
pants have a higher confirmation-bias, and whether their faulty interpersonal evaluation can 
be explained by their selective information search.  
The information provided by former supervisors or colleagues does not usually display 
the whole picture. The validity of references was close to zero. According to the impression 
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management theory (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981), people strategically use and manipu-
late information to influence others and to create a favorable impression, for instance, selec-
tively communicating information to superiors that emphasizes their successes and minimizes 
or hides their own failures (Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982; O’Reilly, 1978).   
Learning Style 
Study 4 investigates further factors influencing the information processing of intuitive 
and rational participants. The results of the Study 1 and 2 show that intuitive and rational 
participants differ significantly in their decision making. Intuitive participants made better 
decisions when working with documents, whereas rational participants made better decisions 
when making interpersonal judgments. In Study 4 we aim to study learning style preferences 
of intuitive and rational participants. Sternberg and Grigorenko consider cognitive style to be 
“a bridge between what might seem to be two fairly distinct areas of psychological investiga-
tion: cognition and personality” (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). The term “learning style” 
refers to a range of constructs from instructional preferences to cognitive style (Riding & 
Cheema, 1991). Curry (1983), locates learning style in between learning preferences and 
cognitive style in a layered model of individual difference constructs.  Kolb (1984) maintains 
that people develop preferences for different learning styles, with four combinations of per-
ceiving and processing of information determining the four learning styles. According to 
Kolb, the learning cycle involves four processes that must be present for learning to occur: 
Active Experimentation (AE), Reflective Observation (RO), Abstract Conceptualization 
(AC) and Concrete Experience (CE).  
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Figure 4. Learning Styles (Kolb, 1984) 
Kolb (1984) differentiates between four different learning styles: two of them explain 
how learners gather experiences, and the other two define how these experiences are proc-
essed. Kolb places learning styles on a coordinate system: concrete experience and abstract, 
analytical thinking are on the Y-axis. They show the way people gather experiences, for ex-
ample, sensing, feeling etc. or in a more analytic, comprehending way. We expect the intui-
tive participants to have higher preferences for Concrete Experience, and rational participants 
to prefer Abstract Generalization. Reflective Observation and Active Experimentation can be 
found on the X-axis. They tell us about how people process their experiences, for example, if 
people are more likely to observe and to reflect or they would like to act and experiment (e.g. 
Smith & Kolb, 1986). This current program of research will be instrumental for compiling 
information about how intuitive and rational participants gather and process their information.  
Some research is known to compare the learning preferences of participants with cog-
nitive styles. For instance, Sadler-Smith et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between 
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the Learning Style Inventory scales (LSI, Kolb, 1985) and Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA; 
Riding et al., 1991).  In this study, we continue this investigation by testing the relationship 
between the cognitive style scales (Rational Experiential Inventory, REI; 1996) and Learning 
Style Inventory scales. We also aim to find out, in what way intuitive and rational partici-
pants gather and process the information. 
Present Research 
This study focuses on intuitive decision making, and whether it is successful at some 
stages of the personnel selection, like e.g. application screening, Assessment Centers etc., or, 
based on the findings of some scientific researchers, should ignored in favor of analytical, 
rational decision making. Intuitive decision making promotes, for example, the reduction of 
short-term costs and saves time when reading all of the documents included in the application. 
Both personnel managers and candidates prefer unstructured interviews, which seem to meas-
ure other constructs than structured interviews (e.g. Schuler & Funke, 1993). Studies 1 and 2 
prove that the combination of cognitive styles (rational or intuitive) with the decision making 
process (rational or intuitive) improves the results in such personnel selection tasks as applica-
tion screening and employment interviews. Study 3 tested these differences in an experimen-
tal paradigm when dealing with the results achieved in an Assessment Center. Study 4 fo-
cused on the learning styles of the intuitive and rational personalities when judging group 
discussion as part of an Assessment Center exercise.  
STUDY 3 
Participants were confronted with the results of 6 different candidates who participated 
in an Assessment Center. Their task was to select the best candidate, as well as to range the 
candidates.  After reading the job description, participants were instructed to evaluate the 
scores and to define the best candidates they would like to hire. The subjects in the rational 
condition had the results presented in a table and were supposed to evaluate and calculate the 
validity of these criteria for the position they read about in the job description (e.g. years of 
47
relevant working experience, educational background etc). In the intuitive condition, partici-
pants received the results in graphic form and were asked to range the candidates based on the 
information presented in the graphic. Pre-testing ensured that the two treatment conditions 
depicted different cognitive strategies. 
METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants in this study were 68 students (48 females and 20 
males) who were recruited on the campus of the University of Munich (LMU). Participant 
ages ranged from 20 to 40 years (M = 25.16, SD = 4.507). They received either an experimen-
tal credit toward their course requirement in psychology or a monetary compensation of 5 
Euro (approximately $7 US). A 2 (cognitive style: rational vs. intuitive) x 2 (method: intuitive 
vs. rational) between-participants factorial design was employed. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Some other studies are known to use similar 
design in order to find out the effectiveness of the expert judgments (e.g. Hammond, Hamm, 
Grassia & Pearson, 1987).  
 Procedure. Participants arrived one by one at the laboratory room. They have received 
the job description of a position as a Chief Architect and six candidate profiles. Participants 
were instructed to read the job description attentively. Based on the information presented in 
the job description (e.g. the tasks and responsibilities of the future employee, the background 
of the applicant and the short description of the company), participants had to decide, which 
of the applicants was the most well suited for the position mentioned in the job description. 
To accomplish this, they received the candidate profiles, either in form of a table or as in a 
graphic form. The profiles included different scores applicants received during the Assess-
ment Center. For instance, work experience, management experience, but also social skills, 
like the ability to work in team etc. The participants had to evaluate the value of these scores 
for the position and to find the best possible candidate for the position mentioned above. They 
also had to range the candidates from one (the best) to six (the less preferred candidate). The 
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Learning Style Inventory and Rational Experiential Inventory were presented either before or 
after evaluation randomly. In order to get a criterion, eleven Human Resource managers were 
asked to select the best candidate and to range the candidates.  
Intuition vs. rationality induction procedure. After a brief instruction, participants en-
gaged in reading the job description and candidates’ profiles. In the rational condition, par-
ticipants were involved in a step-by-step procedure where they had to fill in the table with the 
results relevant to the job for every participant. After the evaluation, participants were sup-
posed to range the candidates in order to determine, who of them should be hired. Participants 
in the intuitive condition have received the same profiles not as a table, but as a graph with the 
candidate profiles, and, after reading a short statement about the importance of the intuitive 
decision making, were asked to make a spontaneous decision. Participants were asked if they 
made their decision more intuitively or rationally.  
Cognitive style measure. The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, 1996), a 
standardized questionnaire, was used to measure the preferences for the intuitive or rational 
cognitive style. REI measures individual preference for intuition, which is understood as a 
purely affective mode and not as a heuristic-affective mode (see Epstein, 1996). Participants 
had to fill in the questionnaire either before or after selection task, randomly. The reliability of 
the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale was above 0.86, and 0.93 for the Need for Cognition (NC), 
measured used Reliability Analysis Procedure in SPSS. 
Dependent measures. Participants were instructed to make a personnel selection deci-
sion, to decide, who of the candidates was the best suited for a position mentioned above. Af-
ter participants evaluated the candidate profiles, they were asked to range the candidates and 
select one of them as the best candidate for a position of the City Architect. In order to define 
the correct range of candidates, Human Resource Professionals were asked to conduct the 
same procedure. When the difference between the range of the candidates made by the HR 
professionals was small, students received more points for the correctly “placed” candidates. 
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Information selection was measured in the following way: after decision was made, partici-
pants received the recommendations from the former colleagues, managers and subordinates 
of the first-choice candidate. Participants were supposed to answer the question if they wanted 
to read the complete positive or negative recommendation about their first-choice candidate. 
After answering this question, participants were asked if they would like to change their opin-
ion and select another candidate.  
Learning Style Measure. The Learning Style Inventory (Kolb, Rubin & Osland, 1995) 
consisting of 24 items comprising single adjectives in six sets from which respondents are 
required to rank (1–4) according to the extent to which they feel the adjective applies to them. 
The four scales are concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract conceptu-
alisation (AC) and active experimentation (AE). As mentioned above, the Questionnaire was 
presented either before or after personnel decision was made,  
RESULTS 
Significant difference was found in the quality of the personnel decision made by in-
tuitive and rational respondents in the own or compensatory condition. Age and sex of the 
participants had no effect on the dependent variable nor were there any significant interactions 
and are not considered further. 
Manipulation check. To assess whether the cognitive inducement task produced the in-
tended effect on the participants, the self-evaluation score was subjected to a one-way analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA). Participants had to evaluate their decision-making on a ten-point 
scale (with 1 - “I decided intuitively” and 10 - “The decision was made rationally”). Results 
revealed a significant main effect for the decision made F(1, 66) = 19.69, p< .001,  
η² = .23. Further statistics showed that participants in the rational condition (M = 6.70, SD = 
2.162) reported their decision making as more rational than intuitive. Participants in the intui-
tive condition (M =  4.21, SD = 2.318) reported their decision was made intuitively. Thus, the 
manipulation was successful.
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Cognitive styles. To assess whether the cognitive style produced the intended effect on 
the results, achieved by the participants, a one-way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) 
was used to assess the differences. Results revealed a difference close to significant for cogni-
tive style F(1, 66) =  3.67, p = .059. The results showed that participants with the intuitive 
cognitive style (M = 5.80) achieved better results than participants with a rational cognitive 
style (M = 4.58).  
Cognitive styles under rational and intuitive conditions. A 2 (cognitive style) x 2 
(condition) analysis in a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant two-
way interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition.  F(1, 64) =  
= 14.955, p< .000, η² = .189. The main effects for cognitive style F(1, 64) = 5.666, p< .05,  
η² = .081, and for intuitive vs. rational condition F(1, 64) = 4.011, p< .05, η² = .059 were sig-
nificant.  
Intuitive participants. Statistical analysis has shown that participants with the intuitive cogni-
tive style (M = 4.9) achieved better results in the compensatory condition than in the own (M
= 3.8, p = .000).  
Rational participants. The similar findings were for the participants with a rational cognitive 
style: (M = 4.00) in the own condition and better, but not significantly, in the intuitive condi-
tion (M = 7.45, p > .05).  
The difference between the step-by-step and spontaneous information processes was not sig-
nificant. The interaction is displayed graphically in the Figure 5, means and standard devia-
tions are in the Tables 5 and 6.  
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Table 5.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational participants in the 
step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        4.00   2.732      16  4.87  2.268    32  
Intuitive 7.45 0.934      11  3.77   1.563     9 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 5. Performance of intuitive and rational cognitive participants in different conditions 
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Table 6.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational cognitive style and 
step-by-step versus spontaneous condition 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Condition       5.40  2.761    27  4.63  2.165    41 
Cognitive Style 4.58*  2.439    48  5.80* 2.238    20 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.  
Information selection.   In order to assess whether the cognitive style produced the in-
tended effect on the type of information selection preferred by the participants, a one-way 
analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was used. Results revealed a significant difference 
for cognitive style F(1, 66) =  10.643, p = .002.  The results revealed that intuitive participants 
were more likely to read the statements supporting their opinion (M= 0.90) than the partici-
pants with a rational cognitive style (M = -0.10).  
Selective information selection under rational and intuitive conditions. A 2 (cognitive 
style) x 2 (condition) analysis in a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a sig-
nificant two-way interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition.  F(1, 
64) = 12.323, p =.001, η² = .161. The main effects for cognitive style F(1, 64) = 4.469, p< .05, 
η² = .065, and for intuitive vs. rational condition F(1, 64) = 11.580, p< .05, η² = .065 were 
significant.  
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Intuitive participants. Statistical analysis has shown that participants with the intuitive cogni-
tive style (M = 0.03) were less likely to read the articles supporting their opinion in the intui-
tive condition than in the rational one (M = 1.50, p < .05).  
Rational participants. Participants with a rational cognitive style were more interested to learn 
about the alternative opinion in the rational condition (M = -0.38) in the own condition and 
better, but not significantly better, in the intuitive condition (M = 0.01, p >.05). Most of the 
participants (98%) were likely to keep their decision regarding the person selected, despite the 
quality of information presented to them after the decision has been made.  Please, find a 
graphical interaction in the Figures 6 and 7, means and standard deviations are listed in the 
Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 7.  Means and Standard Deviations for the information search of the intuitive and 
rational participants in the step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        -0.37   0.957      16  0.00  1.149    32  
Intuitive 1.63 1.361      11  0.00   0.080     9 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 6. Information search of intuitive and rational cognitive participants in different con-
ditions 
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Table 8.  Means and Standard Deviations for the information search of the intuitive and 
rational participants in different conditions  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Condition       0.44  1.502    27  0.00  1.012    41 
Cognitive Style -0.10* 1.096    48  0.90*  1.293      20 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 7. Information search of intuitive and rational cognitive participants in different con-
ditions, searching for supporting or conflicting information 
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DISCUSSION 
 Study 3 replicated the results of the Studies 1 and 2 and revealed that the combination 
of cognitive styles improves the results. In this case, it was achieved using the combination of 
different working methods.  According to some researchers (e.g. Hammond, Hamm, Grassia 
& Pearson, 1987) intuitive cognition frequently outperformed analytical cognition in expert 
judgments. The accuracy of judgments was related to the degree of correspondence between 
the type of task (intuition inducing versus analysis inducing) and the type of the S's cognitive 
activity (intuition versus analysis).  In order to investigate the decision making by rational and 
intuitive Ss, we replicated the results of the previous research (e.g. Agor, 1989) that intuition 
is of help when making personnel decisions based on analysis of sufficient amount of infor-
mation.  
 Study 3 also revealed that intuitive participants have higher confirmation bias than 
rational participants. Rational participants were more likely to read the controversial informa-
tion. This tendency changed when rational participants were asked to make spontaneous deci-
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sions. In this case, they were looking for the articles supporting their opinion rather than for 
controversial information. When dealing with the external recommendations, both strategies 
are wrong. In our study, reading supporting or controversial information did not have an in-
fluence on the quality of decision made. For both methods (supporting or conflicting), the 
validity of the recommendations is much too low to be considered. This part of the findings is 
of more theoretical than practical value. When making spontaneous decisions, both rational 
and intuitive participants were likely to ignore the additional information in favor of the pre-
vious decision made. Further research is necessary to determine if intuitive participants have a 
higher information-bias in cases where they have to evaluate real people and not just docu-
ments. Study 4 continues this investigation.  
STUDY 4 
Study 4 continues the research on the effectiveness of the intuitive decision making in 
different stages of personnel selection. Another goal of the study is to examine whether intui-
tive decision-makers process information differently than rational decision-makers. For this 
purpose, participants were shown a video of a group discussion had by Assessment Center 
participants.  After watching this video, participants were instructed to make a decision about 
the suitability of candidates for a position in a middle level management. Pretesting ensured 
that the two working modes depicted different cognitive strategies. 
METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants in this study were 55 students (34 females and 21 
males), recruited on the campus of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. The age of 
participants ranged between 17 to 39 years (M = 25.87, SD = 3.92). They received experi-
mental credit toward their course requirement in psychology or a monetary compensation of 5 
Euro (approximately $7). A 2 (cognitive style: rational vs. intuitive) x 2 (method: intuitive vs. 
rational) between-participants factorial design was employed, with the random assignment to 
one of the experimental conditions. Some studies are known to use the videos with the thin 
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slices of information, where students were asked to judge the professors filmed after half a 
minute (see Ambady, Hallahan & Rosenthal, 1992). 
 Procedure. Participants arrived one by one at the laboratory room. After a brief in-
struction, they were shown a video (approximately 15 minutes long) with a group discussion. 
The discussion was filmed during the Assessment Center and the topic of the conversation 
was the organization of breaks for different groups of employees. Participants were asked to 
range the candidates presented in the video from 1 (the best candidate) to 6 (the least suitable 
candidate). The Rational Experiential Inventory and Learning Style Inventory were presented 
either before or after the video randomly. The part with the recommendations for the first-
choice candidate was provided after the video.  
 Intuition vs. rationality induction procedure. After reading an instruction, participants 
engaged watching the employment interviews on a video. After half a minute, a video was 
turned out, and participants in the intuitive condition were supposed to make spontaneous 
decision on which candidate they would like to hire. After the first choice was made, partici-
pants were asked to continue watching the video and make their second decision afterwards. 
In the rational condition, participants were watching the video without further interruptions. 
After the video was over, the written instructions asked participants in the rational condition 
to fill in the table with the lists of different personality criteria. Participants in the intuitive 
condition were asked to describe the behavior. Ss in the intuitive condition have received a 
short statement about the importance of the intuitive decision making and were asked to make 
a spontaneous, intuitive decision. Participants were asked about the decision they made, to 
determine if it was more intuitive or rational.  
Cognitive style measure. The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 
1996) standardized questionnaire was used to measure the preferences for the intuitive or ra-
tional cognitive style. The reliability of the scale Faith in Intuition was.89, and the scale Need 
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for Cognition was .78. Reliability analysis was achieved using Reliability Analysis Procedure 
in SPSS. REI was assigned randomly before or after the video. 
Dependent measures. Participants were instructed to range the candidates they have 
seen and to make a decision about the best candidate. In order to get a criterion, Human Re-
source Officers were asked to range the candidates. Participants received more points when 
there was a smaller difference between the range established by the experts and that of the 
participants. In order to measure how intuitive and rational Ss gather and process information, 
the Learning Style Inventory (Kolb, 1984) was used. The information selection procedure was 
carried out in the same way as described in the Study 3. Participants were instructed to read 
eight articles with positive and negative statements about their first-choice candidate. After 
reading an article, Ss were asked if they would like to read the full version of the article. After 
participants accomplished these questions, they were thanked for participating and given their 
credit point. 
RESULTS 
Significant difference was found in the personality evaluation made by intuitive and 
rational respondents in the own or compensatory condition. Sex and age of the participants 
had no effect on the dependent variable. 
Manipulation check. To assess whether the cognitive inducement task produced the in-
tended effect on participants, they were asked about the decision made. The self-evaluation of 
the decision made score (with 1 - “I decided intuitively” and 10 - “The decision was made 
rationally”) was subjected to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results revealed a 
significant main effect for the decision made F(1, 53) = 11.80, p< .001, η² = .18. Further sta-
tistics showed that participants in the rational condition (M = 5.95, SD = 2.513) reported their 
decision making as more rational than intuitive. Participants in the intuitive condition (M =  
3.93, SD = 1.848) reported their decision was made intuitively. Thus, the manipulation was 
successful.
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Cognitive styles.  A one-way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was performed 
to find out if the rational cognitive style was better in the interpersonal evaluation, with the 
cognitive style score subjected to. Results revealed a difference, close to significant, in the 
main effect for cognitive style F(1, 53) = 3.647, p = .062.  The results have shown that par-
ticipants with the rational cognitive style achieved slightly better results (M = 5.90, SD =  
= .870) than participants with an intuitive cognitive style (M = 5.41, SD = 1.018).  
Cognitive styles under rational and intuitive conditions. A 2 (cognitive style) x 2 (condi-
tion) analysis in a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant two-way 
interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition.  F(1, 50) = 9.719, 
p=.003, η² = .163. The main effects for cognitive style F(1, 50) = 4.175, p< .05, η² = .077, and 
for intuitive vs. rational condition F(1, 50) = 9.716, p< .05, η² = .163 were significant as well. 
Intuitive participants. Participants with the intuitive cognitive style (M = 6.08) achieved better 
results in the compensatory condition than in the own (M = 4.75, p = .000).  
Rational participants. The difference of the decision accuracy of the rational participants was 
not significant, they achieved slightly worse results in the step-by-step condition (M = 5.81) 
than in the intuitive one (M = 5.95, p >.05). The interaction is displayed graphically in the 
Figure 7. For means and Standard Deviations, see Tables 9 and 10. There was no significant 
interaction effect found for the feeling of decision certainty. Performance in the step-by-step 
procedure did not reach significance, compared to the spontaneous decision making. 
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Figure 8. Performance of intuitive and rational cognitive participants in different conditions 
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Table 9.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational participants in the 
step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        5.81   0.75      11  5.95  0.944    20  
Intuitive 6.08 0.900      12  4.75   0.621    12 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Information search. Significant interaction effect was found for the selective informa-
tion search. People with the intuitive cognitive style were expected to read the articles sup-
porting their opinion. Rational people were thought to read alternative information when mak-
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ing rational decisions and supportive information in the compensatory condition. A 2 (cogni-
tive style) x 2 (condition) analysis in a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed 
a significant two-way interaction between cognitive style and rational vs. intuitive condition. 
F (1,54) = 3.321, p < 0.05, η² = .085. The main effects for cognitive style  (preference) was 
significant: F (1, 54) = 17.810, p = 0.00, η² = .331, and for intuitive vs. rational condition F
(1,54) = 6,864, p = 0.00, η² = .085 were found to be significant.  
Intuitive participants. Similar to the findings in the Study 3, participants with the intuitive 
cognitive style were less likely to read the articles supporting their opinion in the intuitive 
condition (M = 1.33, SD = 1.566) than in the rational one (M = 1.50, SD = .492, p > .05), but 
this difference did not reach significance.   
Rational particpants. Participants with a rational cognitive style were more interested to learn 
about the alternative opinion in the intuitive condition (M = -0.82, SD = 1.328) condition and 
significantly less in the rational condition (M = 1.45, SD = 1.932, p = .002). Please, find a 
graphical interaction in the Figure 9, means and standard deviations are listed in the Table 10.  
Figure 9. Information search of intuitive and rational cognitive participants in different condi-
tions. 
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Table 10.  Means and Standard Deviations for the information search of the intuitive and 
rational participants in the step-by-step and intuitive condition  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Condition 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational, step-by-step  intuitive, spontaneous 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Rational        -0.81  1.328      11  1.45  1.932    20  
Intuitive 1.50  1.567    12      1.33   0.492     12 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 11.  Means and Standard Deviations of the intuitive and rational cognitive style and 
step-by-step versus spontaneous condition 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
Condition       0.39*  1.852    23  1.40*  1.542    32 
Cognitive Style 0.64  2.042    31  1.41 1.138    24
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Learning styles. Significant correlations were found between the following learning 
styles: AC and CE (r = -.729) and AE and RO (r = -0.464), but also RO and AC (r = -.405). 
The findings do not support the idea of two bipolar dimensions (see Yahya, 1998). There was 
statistically significant correlation between intuitive cognitive style and such learning styles, 
as CE (r = .430, p = .001) and AC (r = -.373, p = .001). Rational cognitive style did not corre-
late with the learning styles, which supports previous findings (e.g. Riding & Rayner, 1998). 
Previous research has shown an interaction between style and gender (e.g. Sadler-Smith et al., 
2001). Repeated Measures procedure was used in SPSS to test the hypothesis if there are any 
differences in the learning preferences of intuitive and rational people, with gender as a co-
variate. The learning by cognitive style interaction effect was significant F (3, 156) =  
= 2.854, p = .039. Learning style by gender interaction was also significant: F (3, 156) =  
= 15.481, p = .000. Main effect of learning style was significant F (3, 156) = 16.998, p = .000. 
The main effect of cognitive style was not significant. Participants with rational cognitive 
style were more likely to prefer the RO (Realistic Observation) style (M = 22.62, SD =  
= 4.631, p <.05), and participants with the intuitive cognitive style were likely to choose AE 
(Active Experimentation) learning style (M = 24.03, SD = 3.894, p <.05). Means and standard 
deviations are presented in the Table 12 and the Interaction is displayed graphically in the 
Figure 10. 
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Table 12. Means of the Learning Style Preferences for intuitive and rational cognitive 
styles      
_____________________________________________________________________ 
     Cognitive Style 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
CE             22.12     4.917      31  22.62   4.232      24 
RO  22.62*   4.631       31  19.45*    2.873      24 
AC  24.00     5.259       31       23.54      4.021      24 
AE  22.03*     3.894       31     24.37*     3.563     24        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 NOTE: CE = Concrete Experience, RO = Realistic Observation, AC = Abstract Conceptual-
izing, AE = Active Experience. 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 10. Learning preferences of intuitive and rational participants 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In two studies, the results of the Studies 1 and 2 were replicated. It was found that the 
combination of the cognitive style and the way people process tasks can improve their per-
formance in the personnel selection procedures.  The results of the Study 3 support the find-
ings of the Study 1, stating that intuition should not be put aside, but is quite helpful in such 
situations, when quick decisions are needed. In the Study 3, intuitive decision making was 
found to be more accurate when handling with the results of the Assessment Center. Rational-
ity was found to be more useful for the interpersonal judgments, which was in line with the 
results from the Study 2. This was very noticeable in the employment interviews or as observ-
ers during the Assessment Center. These findings can be explained by considering the learn-
ing style preferences of the intuitive and rational participants. Rational participants tend to use 
Realistic Observation, which might explain their good observer qualities. Intuitive partici-
pants tend to use Active Experimentation and might handle data with ease, in comparison to 
the rational participants. Intuitive participants showed higher confirmation bias than rational 
participants, especially in the step-by-step procedure. Rational participants were interested in 
the controversial information, but not when asked to decide spontaneously. 
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Rational participants were also likely to choose the Abstract Conceptualization Learn-
ing style. According to Kolb (1985), people with this learning style preference are often theo-
rists who enjoy learning through frontal lectures, and by trying to find out the relationships 
between some actions. Learners with the combination of such learning styles as Abstract 
Conceptualization and Realistic Observation are called “Assimilators”. The strengths of this 
learning style can be seen in the conception of the theoretical models. They are likely to make 
inductive conclusions and integrate the separate facts to the concepts and definitions. People 
with these learning preferences are more likely to work as mathematicians or scientists. 
Intuitive participants were also likely to choose Concrete Experience. Learners with 
Concrete Experience style are considered to be pragmatists, having knowledge application as 
the focus of their investigation. Active Experimentation is typical for activists searching for 
new experiences. The combination of both learning styles – Active Experimentation and Con-
crete Experience is called Accommodator. The strengths of these learning styles are in the 
design of activities. They are likely to learn by trial-and-error, do not trust theories, but rather 
their own experiences. They specialize in practical activities and are likely to make their deci-
sions intuitively.   
Limitations 
The participants of the both studies were mainly students in higher semesters with a 
major or minor in Psychology and having some background in the personnel selection. Both 
experiments were carried out in the laboratory setting, which is a mechanic setting. According 
to Armstrong & Priola (2001), rational participants perform better in the mechanic setting 
than in the organic or natural one. The opposite is valid for the intuitive participants. The fu-
ture research should be carried out in the organic setting.  
In the Studies 1 to 4, we have investigated the cognitive styles of the participants mak-
ing a personnel decision. We did not consider the cognitive style of a candidate, a person, 
applying for a position. Are intuitive or rational candidates preferred? Are intuitive and ra-
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tional participants come along with each other? How do they work together? We consider 
these questions to have a very high importance for the Human Resources. The future research 
should investigate if rational and intuitive people work well with each other as a team, and if 
this work is effective.  
Implications 
Practical implications. Despite of the big amount of literature about the different methods in 
the personnel selection, studying their validity, too little have tried to explain their influence 
on the decision accuracy, and even less have spent time studying intuition in the personnel 
selection. Personnel managers select their employees by luck and intuition (Nowicki & Rosse, 
2002). To sum up, intuition is assisting in case if apply it when working with papers than 
when making interpersonal decisions. Intuition might be used in order to reduce the informa-
tion to be evaluated, e.g. when screening applications or resumes or handling with scores.  
Theoretical Implications. The findings of this study support the previous results of the Studies 
1, 2 and 3. Regarding information search, rational participants are likely to overestimate the 
controversial arguments, but not in the case when they are under time pressure and need to 
make a spontaneous decision. In this case, they are likely to view the information supporting 
their opinion. Intuitive participants were more likely to search for support of their opinion.  
This study has also investigated the preferences for learning styles of the participants with 
different cognitive styles. Rational participants were likely to use the Realistic Observation 
when obtaining new information. This might explain their preference for reading controver-
sial information. Intuitive participants were more likely to apply Active Experimentation, and 
this might explain their selective information search. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Studies 3 and 4 continued investigation on the intuitive and rational decision making 
in different stages of the personnel selection. Intuitive decision makers were found to be better 
when handling with big amounts of partially missing, irrelevant information or handling 
scores of the standardized procedures. They also had higher preferences for cognitive bias and 
selecting the recommendations supporting their opinion then opposite to it. This could be ex-
plained by their learning style preferences – active and pragmatic. Looking for new things and 
implementing findings. Rational decision makers were more theoretical and looking for con-
troversial information, except for the situations when under stress or forced to make a deci-
sion. In this case, similar to the intuitive participants, they also tend to search for consistent 
information. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GROUP WORK EFFECTIVENESS OF RATIONAL, INTUITIVE AND HETEROGENE-
OUS GROUPS  
In the present research we have studied group performance using groups that were ei-
ther intuitive, rational, homogeneous or heterogeneous. Organisations are known to replace 
their traditional hierarchies with self-managing work teams (SMWTs) with the aim to im-
prove the effectiveness of the whole organization (Manz & Sims, 1993; Lawler, Mohrman & 
Ledford, 1992). The question of the person-team fit is as important as the person-organization 
fit, especially due to this modern trend to work in teams. Successful team performance de-
pends on whether the team members get along with each other or not. One of the central ques-
tions in the personnel selection is whether the future employee will suit the team, and if the 
team will be successful. Previous research has concentrated on many different aspects in order 
to improve the effectiveness of the working teams. In this study we have analyzed the cogni-
tive style of group members, which is considered to be an important predictor of effective 
decision making (e.g. Armstrong & Priola, 2001). We have compared the teamwork of learn-
ing teams with different cognitive styles (intuitive versus rational homogeneous groups) and 
groups with both cognitive styles present. Intuitive groups evaluated their group performance 
significantly better than rational and heterogeneous groups. The results of the study revealed 
that intuitive groups have higher group cohesion and person-orientation than rational or het-
erogeneous groups.  
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INTRODUCTION 
GROUP WORK SUCCESS OF INTUITIVE AND RATIONAL TEAMS   
Ability to work in teams is one of the most important social skills in the organizational 
setting. One of the most effective criteria of successful teamwork is the evaluation of this 
work by the team members. It does not matter if you are working face-to-face with your team 
members or if you are a part of the virtual team: the group constitution is important. As long 
as there is just one disagreeable team member it can be enough to disrupt team performance 
(O'Neil et al., 1997).  Study 5 investigates how intuitive, rational and mixed groups get along 
with each other. In the study of Armstrong and Priola (2001), intuitive groups were found to 
perform better than intuitive and heterogeneous groups. In this study we consider further fac-
tors important for the group performance, such as group cohesion, task performance, and  
orientation (person vs. structure). The participants of the study were groups of students in 
their first and second semesters of a semi-virtual program. For learning purposes, students 
work in groups and are supposed to implement many different tasks in diverse subjects, both 
virtually, and in onsite phases. They meet once every 2 months for a week. During this time 
they communicate intensely with each other, visit seminars and complete their projects and 
tasks. Between the onsite phases, students are free to decide when they meet each other, how 
often and how to structure their work on their learning tasks. Group work is expected in al-
most all the subjects (e.g. Marketing, Economics, English etc.).  In our study, we asked the 
members of such learning groups to evaluate their group work on different aspects (group 
cohesion, task performance, objective orientation etc.), and to make a decision if they would 
like to stay as a group. 
Performance in Self-Managing Teams 
Self-Managing Working Teams (SMWTs), defined as “work groups that are formally 
organized into teams… and given responsibility and authority beyond that traditionally ex-
perienced by line workers” (Stewart & Manz, 1995, p. 749), seem to win their popularity in 
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organisations. Teams and not managers allocate working tasks and schedules, resolve their 
interpersonal and task problems and define how long they want to stay together as a group 
(Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Manz & Sims, 1993). Giving employees the feeling of control 
over their activities was found to improve productivity, motivation, quality and efficiency 
(e.g. Deci, Connell, & Tyan, 1990; Cohen & Ledford, 1994). At the same time, some studies 
reported between 80% and 90% of teams have difficulties with performance (Gabarro, 1987; 
Kuypers, Davies, & Hazewinkel, 1986). Quite a few studies researched the interaction of the 
individual characteristics and types of tasks within a team to influence team performance and 
effectiveness. For example,  extraversion, conscientiousness (e.g. Barry & Stewart, 1997), or 
general cognitive ability (LePine et al., 1997; Barrick et al 1989) were found to be important 
for the overall group performance. For instance, Barrick et al (1989) have found conscien-
tiousness, general cognitive ability, and extraversion were found to predict overall team per-
formance ratings in manufacturing work teams, in case of independent member contribution 
to the outcome. Biased information search (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens & Moscovici, 
2000; Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, Frey, 2002) and experience on the group performance (Brod-
beck & Greitemeyer, 2000) are known to influence team performance as well.  
Collective efficacy was also found to be related to indicators of team performance at 
both individual and group levels of analysis. Consistent with social cognitive theory, collec-
tive efficacy was a stronger predictor of team performance than team members’ perceptions of 
their self-efficacy (Lent et al., 2005). The social cognitive theory explains how people acquire 
and maintain certain behavioral patterns, while also providing the basis for intervention 
strategies (Bandura, 1997). Such factors environment, people and behavior are constantly 
influencing each other. The way you describe your group is important for the overall group 
performance. Bandura (1997) defines collective efficacy as follows: “…group’s shared beliefs 
in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce 
given levels of attainments” (p. 477). This definition refers to group members’ aggregate be-
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liefs about how they can perform as a unit (Lent et al., 2005). In this study we have asked 
groups about their opinion of their performance as a group. The self-evaluations of intuitive, 
rational and heterogeneous groups on the person and structure orientation, as well as group 
cohesion, responsibility taking, task accomplishment and objective orientation were investi-
gated. When this survey was carried out, groups were working with each other for minimum 
half a year, and maximum a year.  
Social-emotional activities, or person-orientation of the group were concerned with 
group solidarity and attraction between members. Task orientation was found to be related 
with goal attainment (Zaccaro, 1991, Zaccaro & Lowe, 1988). People, high in task orientation 
were likely to be poor in terms of the emotional support they give their group (Foot, 
1982).We expect intuitive groups to be more person-oriented and rational groups – more task-
oriented. Cohesion includes group interaction, individual perceptions about the closeness of 
the group, similarity and boding with the group as a whole (see Carron, Widmeyer & Braw-
ley, 1985).  Group cohesion was found to positively influence individual behaviors (e.g., ad-
herence), affect (e.g., satisfaction, attitude), and cognitions (Carron, Hausenblas, & Mack, 
1996). Group cohesion is especially important when working in the virtual environment. Ac-
cording to the previous findings (e.g. Armstrong & Priola, 2001), we expect intuitive homo-
geneous groups to have higher team cohesion than heterogeneous or rational homogeneous 
groups.  
Another point important for the successful performance of the learning groups is the 
willingness to take responsibility. Many of the students are employed and their learning en-
gagement depends on them being ready to take the responsibility. The other two aspects we 
would like to measure in this study are objective orientation and task accomplishment. These 
two aspects are especially important when the students meet each other during the presence 
phase. In this case, the participants of the group decide if they are likely to chat about their 
private things would like to concentrate on the learning purposes. 
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Intuitive and Rational Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous groups 
Despite the fact, that heterogeneous groups have higher resource potential, which 
leads to better performance (e.g. Hoffmann, 1965), homogeneous groups are likely to stay 
together longer. Employee turnover is one of the factors of organizational success, and if you 
consider the recruitment costs, time spent to get into the tasks, and loss of expert knowledge.  
Jackson et al. (1991) have found turnover rate to be predicted by group heterogeneity. In case 
of internal recruitment, teams were likely to be homogeneous and similarity was found to 
influence the attractiveness of the group (see Sader, 1991). Intention to remain a member of a 
unit is considered a form of behavioral commitment (Mottaz, 1989) and has been shown to 
be directly related to actual turnover from organizations (Kraut, 1975; O’Reilly, Chatman, & 
Caldwell, 1991). Some heterogeneous teams may be able to stop their mutual work even be-
fore their first meeting. One of the questions this research addresses is whetherhomogeneous 
(intuitive versus rational groups) and heterogeneous groups prefer to stay as a group and how 
they evaluate mutual work. A bulk of studies on the heterogeneous and homogeneous groups 
as well as group performance was carried out. Some studies concentrated on such factors, as 
demographic diversity—culture, age, gender, race, and tenure (e.g., Jackson et al., 
1991;Wagner, Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984). Armstrong & Priola (2001) investigated group 
performance of the rational and intuitive homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Where 
intuitive groups were found to be more successful than rational and heterogeneous groups. 
Based on the results of the research made by Armstrong & Priola (2001), we expect intuitive 
groups to be more effective than rational or heterogeneous groups.  
The main task of the participants of this study is to learn. In this study, we would like 
to determine if the effective or ineffective group performance cannot be explained by the 
preferred learning style of the group members. According to the findings of the Study 4, we 
expect intuitive participants to have different learning style preferences than rational groups.  
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Present Research 
Study 5 focuses on the question team performance of the intuitive, rational and mixed-
up teams. Based on the results of the previous studies (e.g. Armstrong & Priola, 2001; Priola 
et. al, 2004), we expect the intuitive homogeneous groups to evaluate higher their group per-
formance than heterogeneous or rational groups. Either you create a new team, or you select 
into a pre-existing team, team structure should be taken into account. We have considered 
cognitive styles of the group members. In order to evaluate collective efficacy of the team, we 
have asked the participants about their person versus structure orientation as a group. Other 
factors, like group coherence, willingness to take responsibility, goal-orientation and task per-
formance were measured as well. These factors were found to explain the bad team perform-
ance (Beckhard, 1972; West, 1990). Questionnaire on Teamwork (Kauffeld & Frieling, 2001) 
was applied.  
STUDY 5 
Participants of the Study were students of the 1st and 2nd semester, with their majors in 
Economics, Business Psychology or Sport Management. Students have already worked for at 
least half a year (1st semester) or a year (2nd semester students) and have implemented differ-
ent learning tasks together. For instance, to make a group presentation in the Marketing class, 
or solve a case study in Economics. Groups were also assigned to make some more compli-
cated projects together. Students felt free to determine their schedule for group meetings. 
Every group has a name and a logo. In this survey, students were asked about their group 
name, but not about their own name. Due to this half-anonymous reply, we did not take the 
personal competence of the participants into account. Students were asked about their team 
performance. Cognitive and learning style was of the participants were measured as well. This 
investigation was carried out on-line.  
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METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants in this study were 80 students (38 females and 42 
males) of the University of Applied Management in Erding, Germany. Participants’ age 
ranged between 17 to 42 years (M = 24.38, SD = 3.99). As a compensation for the participa-
tion in the survey, students received feedback about their learning style with the recommenda-
tion for the learning methods they should apply to improve their learning performance.  
Procedure. Participants received an email from the university, asking to participate in 
the survey to find out if the group work is moving on well and to gather an overview about 
their learning preferences. Students were asked to complete the online questionnaire and an-
swer the questions about their group work effectiveness in the virtual and in the presence 
phases, on their cognitive and learning style and answer the questions regarding different as-
pects of the group work. 
Cognitive style measure. Similar to the studies 1 to 4, we used the Rational Experien-
tial Inventory (REI; Epstein, 1996), a standardized questionnaire used to measure the prefer-
ences for the intuitive or rational cognitive style. REI measures individual preference for in-
tuition, which is understood as a purely affective mode and not as a heuristic-affective mode 
(sees Epstein, 1996). Reliability analysis was made in SPSS and the reliability of the Faith in 
Intuition (FI) scale was above 0.80, and 0.90 for the Need for Cognition (NC), measured by 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Keller et al., 2000). Cronbachs alpha of the scales from 
Questionnaire on Teamwork, received also using SPSS, were above .79 and are listed in the 
Table 13.  
Cognitive style of the group. At the beginning of the research, the students were asked 
to write down the name of their group. After that they were assigned to fill in the REI to 
measure their cognitive style. The results were grouped together by names of the groups. The 
further investigation has shown the group composition, consisting of students with different or 
similar cognitive styles.  
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Table 13. Internal Consistency of the Scales and Subscales of the Questionnaire on Teamwork 
___________________________________________ 
 (Sub-)Scale    Reliability 
___________________________________________ 
Person-orientation   .90 
Structure-orientation   .95 
Responsibility    .79 
Cohesion    .91 
Task Performance   .90 
Goal Orientation   .91 
_________________________________________ 
Learning Style Measure. The Learning Style Inventory (Kolb, Osland & Rubin, 1995) 
consists of 24 items comprising single adjectives in six sets from which respondents are re-
quired to rank (1–4) according to the extent to which they feel the adjective applies to them. 
The four scales are concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract conceptu-
alisation (AC) and active experimentation (AE).  
Dependent measures. Questionnaire on Teamwork (Kauffeld & Frieling, 2001) was 
applied. Students were asked to evaluate their group effectiveness answering the questions on 
a 10-point scale. Such constructs as group cohesion, willingness to accept responsibility and 
task accomplishment, and objective orientation were measured. 
RESULTS 
Significant difference was found in the evaluation of the team performance and the in-
tuitive style of the group. Age and sex of the participants had no effect on the dependent vari-
able nor were there any significant interactions and are not considered further. 
Learning styles. Significant correlation was found between the following learning 
styles: AC and CE (r = -.665) and AE and RO (r = -.608), but also RO and AC (r = -.236), as 
77
well as RO and AE (r = -.608). The findings do not support the idea of two bipolar dimen-
sions (see Yahya, 1998) and replicate the findings of the Study 4. This means that the two 
bipolar dimensions of learning style are not virtually orthogonal. The preference for one 
learning style (e.g. Active Experimentation) excludes the learning preference for some others 
(e.g. Realistic Observation. Despite the previous findings (e.g. Sadler-Smith et al., 2001) and 
supporting the results of the Study 4, no interaction was found between learning style prefer-
ences and gender.  
Table 14. Correlations of the Subscales of Learning Style Inventory  
________________________________________________________________ 
Subscale  CE  RO  AC  AE 
________________________________________________________________ 
CE   1.000  -.080  -.665** -.361* 
RO   -.080  1.000  -.236*  -.608* 
AC   -.665** -.236*  1.000  .133 
AE   -.361** -.608** .133  1.000 
________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. CE = Concrete Experience, RO = Realistic Observation, AC = Abstract Con-
ceptualizing, AE = Active Experience. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Cognitive styles and learning styles. Repeated Measures procedure was used in SPSS 
to test the hypothesis if there are any differences in the learning style preferences of intuitive 
and rational people.  The learning by cognitive style interaction effect was significant F (3, 
234) = 13.690, p = .000, η² = .149. Main effect of learning style was significant F (3, 234) =  
= 7.571, p = .000, η² = .088. The main effect of cognitive style was not significant  F (1,  
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234) =  0.97, p = .075, η² = .001. In sum, participants with rational cognitive style were more 
likely to prefer the AC (Abstract Conceptualization) and RO (Realistic Observation) learning 
styles. Participants with the intuitive cognitive style were likely to choose AE (Active Ex-
perimentation) and CE (Concrete Experience) learning styles. Means and standard deviations 
are listed in the Table 15 and can be seen in the Figure 12.  
Table 15. Means and standard deviations for the learning style preferences  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
     Cognitive Style 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational   intuitive 
_____________________________________________________________ 
M    SD        N   M    SD    N
_____________________________________________________________ 
CE             19.95*     4.50       54  23.62*   3.23     26 
RO  23.62*     3.50     54  19.76*   3.82       26 
AC  26.00*     3.54      54       23.27*     3.28      26 
AE  20.81*     3.70      54     23.88*     3.92        26 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 NOTE: CE = Concrete Experience, RO = Realistic Observation, AC = Abstract Con-
ceptualizing, AE = Active Experience. 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 12. Learning style preferences of intuitive and rational participants 
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Cognitive styles and team work. Repeated Measures procedure in SPSS was used to 
test if there is any interaction effects between homogeneous (intuitive and rational) and het-
erogeneous groups in their evaluation of the group work. Interaction effect of group composi-
tion by the evaluation of the team work (cohesion, willingness to accept responsibility, task 
accomplishment, objective orientation) was significant F(6, 231) = 4.482, p = .000, η² = .104. 
The main effects for cognitive style was also significant F(2, 77) =  
= .15.036, p = .000, η² = .281, and the main effect of the team performance was significant 
F(3, 231) = 52.620, p = .000, η² = .406.  Means and standard deviations are presented in the 
Table 16. Post-Hoc Test revealed significant differences between the groups.  
Group cohesion received the highest evaluations, especially by the intuitive group (M = 8.36, 
SD = .872). Homogenous intuitive groups evaluated their team cohesion significantly better 
than rational (M = 7.56, SD = 1.407) and heterogeneous groups, (M = 5.17, SD = 2.575, p <  
< .05). 
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There was no significant difference found in the evaluation of the other team work aspects 
between the intuitive homogenous and heterogeneous groups. Rational groups evaluated their 
team work significantly worse.  
Table 16. Means of the Team Performance Evaluation  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
     Cognitive Style 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Scale  rational     intuitive   heterogeneous 
_______________________________________________________________ 
M      SD         M      SD              M       SD     
_______________________________________________________________ 
COH          5.165      2.575  8.357    .872  7.558       1.407 
RES          4.552 2.304  6.410   1.668             6.101       1.759 
OBJ          3.664  2.246  5.833      .919              5.463       1.384 
TASK          3.500 2.822  7.053     1.201    6.563       1.934 
P-O          9.717 4.471  14.767    2.413            13.659      2.788 
S-O           7.164 4.977  12.886    1.956 12.026       3.199 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE: COH = Cohesion, RES = Responsibility, OBJ = Objective Orientation, TASK = Task 
Accomplishment, P-O = Person Orientation, S -O = Structure Orientation. 
Willingness to take Responsibility. No significant difference was found in the willingness to 
take responsibility between the intuitive homogeneous (M = 6.41, SD = 1.668)
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and heterogeneous groups (M = 6.10, SD = 1.759, p > .05). Rational groups have evaluated 
their group’s willingness to take responsibility significantly worse (M = 4.55, SD = 2.304, p < 
<.05).
Objective Orientation. Rational groups (M = 3.66, SD = 2.246) have judged their objective 
orientation significantly worse than intuitive (M = 5.88, SD = .919, p < .05) and heterogene-
ous groups (M = 5.46, SD = 1.668, p < .05). The difference between intuitive and heterogene-
ous groups did not reach significance. 
Task Accomplishment. Intuitive groups (M = 7.05, SD =  1.201) reported the highest task ac-
complishment, heterogeneous groups slightly less (M = 6.56, SD =  1.934, p > .05) and ra-
tional groups significantly less (M = 3.50, SD =  2.822, p < .05) than both other groups. 
Person-Orientation versus Structure-Orientation. Intuitive homogenous (M = 14.76,  SD =   
= 2.413) and heterogenous groups (M = 13.69, SD =  2.788) were found to be significantly 
more person-oriented than rational groups (M = 9.71, SD =  4.471, p < 0.05). Intuitive group 
being slightly better than heterogenous, but this difference did not reach significance (p >  
> .05). Rational groups (M = 7.16, SD =  4.977, p < 0.05)  had lower scores in the Structure 
Orientation than intuitive (M = 12.88, SD =  1.956)  and heterogenous (M = 12.02, SD =  
= 3.199, p > .05) groups. No significant difference was found between the latter two groups. 
Wish to remain in the group. The evaluation of the team performance explains the wish to 
stay or leave the group: participants of the intuitive groups wished to remain in the same 
group. Less than a half of the rational groups (42%) reported the same. Heterogeneous groups 
took the place in the middle (78%) of the heterogenous groups wished to remain in the same 
group. Chi-Square Test was run in SPSS to test the difference between the groups. The results 
showed that this difference was significant χ2 (2) = 14.165, p = .001. 
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Figure 13. Team performance evaluation of intuitive, rational and heterogeneous groups 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
COH RESPO OBJECT TASKP P - O T - O
rational
groups
intuitive
groups
heterogen
eous
groups
83
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Successful team composition is a challenge for personnel selection practitioners. The 
main question is what kinds of teams are preferred: homogeneous or heterogeneous? Homo-
geneous teams reduce organizational turnover and consist of similar people. It means they are 
attractive to the people working together. Heterogeneous groups are known to increase per-
formance effectiveness and serve as an attrition to the candidates. The results of this study 
have shown that even one factor, like cognitive style of the group participants, makes a big 
difference in the evaluation of their evaluation of their team work. In sum, the results of this 
study support the findings recommending teams with members who have different cognitive 
styles (Foot, 1982). Heterogeneous groups evaluated their performance significantly better 
than rational homogeneous groups and not worse than intuitive groups. Most participants 
(app. 80%) wished to remain in the same group. According to the Kolb’s Learning Style In-
ventory, intuitive and rational participants have different learning styles. Intuitive learners 
prefer Concrete Experience and Active Experimentation. Rational learners are likely to select 
Realistic Observation and Abstract Conceptualisation. The combination of all the learning 
styles in the group for the learning purpose might help participants to manage them with ease. 
It is true that if differences are accepted and used in the very best way by the participants. 
Some studies have really found that group composition of members with different cognitive 
styles leads to personality difficulties within groups (Reddy & Byrnes, 1972).  
In the study of Armstrong & Priola (2001), intuitive participants were most likely to 
be selected as leaders, both in the intuitive and heterogeneous groups. This might explain the 
success of the heterogenous groups in this setting. In our research, we could not test this hy-
pothesis, since there were no official group leaders in these groups.  
In sum, heterogeneous groups have reported successful team performance. However, 
intuitive homogeneous groups were better. Study 5 replicated the findings of Armstrong & 
Priola (2001) that the intuitive homogenous groups were more person-oriented than rational 
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groups and, at the same time, also very task-oriented. Task oriented people determine the 
group selection  and set goals, as long as person-oriented people focus on the relationship 
among the group members (Kauffeld & Frieling, 2001). Rational participants reported lower 
level of person-orientation. This means that intuitive team players are more likely to show 
solidarity, empathy and attraction to other members. Intuitive members are likely to engage 
more in their group work than rational. Rational groups have more difficulties in working 
with each other and are likely to leave their groups.  
One dimension where intuitive homogeneous groups received the highest scores was 
group cohesion. Cohesion includes group interaction and individual perceptions about the 
closeness of the group, similarity and boding with the group as a whole (e.g. Caron, Wid-
meyer & Brawley, 1998 etc.). This factor is especially important for virtual teams. In our 
situation, the ability to keep in touch between the onsite phases means successful overall per-
formance. The high scores on group cohesion might explain that intuitive participants wish to 
remain in the same group.  
Our study was carried out in the natural setting, which was an adaptation of the recent 
study by Priola et al. (2004) where team effectiveness was tested in the laboratory (mechanic 
setting). The results looked totally different. Rational group solved their task successfully. 
They did not engage into the interpersonal relationship matters. Intuitive group spent much 
more time on interpersonal issues and heterogeneous group reported communication difficul-
ties. This means that for a short period of time, and in the mechanic setting, rational groups 
should be preferred. The present study was carried out in the organic, natural setting. Students 
had quite flexible working conditions and were working with each other for a long period of 
time. Similar to Priola et al. (2004), we support the opinion that environment should be taken 
into account not only for the experimental purposes but for the successful team combinations 
as well. 
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 As mentioned above, Study 5 has repeated investigation on the preferences for the 
learning styles among the students with different cognitive styles. In sum, results of Study 5 
replicated the results of Study 4: Rational participants were likely to choose the Abstract Con-
ceptualization Learning style and Realistic Observation, which means that such people are 
more theorists than practitioners, searching for relationships between some actions Kolb 
(1985). Intuitive participants have chosen Concrete Experience and Active Experimentation, 
which indicate that they are more pragmatic, investigating, and, in general, more balanced 
than rational team members. There was no relationship found between the learning style and 
the overall evaluation of the team work. 
 In sum, the results of this study revealed intuitive homogeneous and heterogeneous 
groups to be more effective than rational groups. Both, intuitive and heterogeneous groups 
evaluated their group performance in all the aspects much better than homogeneous rational 
groups. Intuitive groups reported higher group cohesion than heterogeneous and rational 
groups and were more likely to remain in their groups. The results support the findings of the 
previous research. 
Limitations 
 The survey was carried out on the internet, and, despite the fact that all the participants 
were used to learning online, there might still have been some troubles understanding the 
questions. We also did not consider objective level of competence of the group and of the 
group members. The future research should concentrate not only on the subjective perform-
ance evaluation, but also on the objective task performance in different subjects. 
 For the objective purposes, we could not ask about the information group leader and 
did not test the hypothesis that the intuitive members are likely to be selected as group lead-
ers. We consider this point very important for the future research as long as it has a value for 
the selection of managers. It is also recommended to replicate this study in the laboratory set-
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ting, when participants are given a selected task and have to solve it during a shorter time pe-
riod. 
Implications 
 Despite of the large amount of literature about group work, team performance, team 
diagnosis etc., there is still very little research on the cognitive preferences of team members. 
Despite this fact, we consider the findings of the Study 5 to be of more practical than theoreti-
cal relevance. First, managers and Human Resource should consider the cognitive style of the 
group members when making personnel selection decisions.Second, organizational setting is 
to be taken into account. In cases where this setting is natural and not over structured, intui-
tive and heterogeneous groups are recommended. For virtual team work, intuitive teams are 
even better, as long as they are likely to feel as a group even when not working face-to-face 
with each other. Heterogeneous groups did not perform any worse than intuitive homogene-
ous groups, and intuitive groups wish to remain in the same group. They are especially rec-
ommended in the situations when different combinations of the learning styles are needed to 
solve the tasks.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the Studies 1 to 4, personnel decisions made by the participants were tested with 
different cognitive styles. Participants were asked to select the best candidate based on his 
resume and recommendations (Study 1). The candidates had to be evaluated after the struc-
tured interview (Study 2) or after the group discussion during the Assessment Center (Study 
4). Participants also had the possibility to decide using the scored of the candidates achieved 
during the Assessment Center (Study 3). The results of the first four studies revealed that the 
intuitive cognitive style was very successful in situations when working with scores and ana-
lyzing resumes. This finding supports opinions of the organizational practitioners (Agor, 1989 
etc.). At the same time, intuitive interpersonal judgment was significantly worse than rational. 
This finding supports the recommendations of many organizational psychologists to use stan-
dardized methods (e.g. personality tests and structured interviews). One explanation of these 
findings is that intuitive participants have a higher confirmation-bias than rational partici-
pants, which was found to influence negatively successful decision making (e.g. Kray & Ga-
linski, 2003). For organizations, it is still far worse to select the false person than not to select 
the right person (Schuler, 2001). When intuitive participants preferred one candidate over 
another, they made substantial errors in the evaluation of personality traits. Also, when read-
ing recommendations supporting their opinion about the preferred candidate, they were more 
likely to read them than the opposite ones. Rational participants were more likely to read the 
alternative opinions about the candidates to get a whole picture of the candidate as a person. 
We have tried to explain these findings by measuring learning style preferences of the partici-
pants. Rational participants were significantly better than intuitive in the Realistic Observa-
tion, as long as intuitive ones preferred Active Experimentation and Concrete Experience. 
This means that intuitive participants are more pragmatic and wish to try something new, but 
are not necessarily good in observation, which is substantial for the interpersonal judgment. 
Their strengths lie in searching for new things and implementing new things. Rational deci-
88
sion makers were more theoretical and are looking for controversial information, with no 
preferences for confirmation bias when making decisions. 
In the Study 5, we have measured the performance evaluation of groups with rational 
and intuitive cognitive styles in the organic setting. The findings supported the results of the 
previous studies that intuitive groups are more successful when working in the natural condi-
tions. Intuitive members come along with each other and don’t report difficulties even when 
working in the virtual environment. Heterogeneous groups reported no difficulties in the mu-
tual work or communication with each other.  
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